The CIA director reports that the Agency is in control of Liang Sicheng’s brother in the US and is using him to arrange a meeting between the two men in Mexico City, in which Liang Sicheng's defection would be raised as a real possibility.

This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. 

The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War.  It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.

A resolution on combatting “Chinese spies” in Vietnam. The resolution directs Vietnam's Public Security to establish a special interrogation center to which all known and suspected “Chinese spies” who had been arrested would be sent for detailed interrogation by trained professionals. The interrogations would help Vietnam to identify existing Chinese espionage operations and to obtain information on the Chinese intelligence organizations, their plans, and their targets. 

A report on information obtained from a member of the Chinese intelligence service; this report discusses their opinions on East German-Soviet relations, relations between China and East Germany and China and the Soviet Union, and economic relations between East Germany and China.

Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

The Indian Embassy in Beijing sent a letter to the Indian Foreign Secretary to prove an analysis of Chinese foreign policy, such as Beijing's relationship with the West and the impact of Sino-Soviet split on Chinese foreign relations.

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

An ailing Mao Zedong and Robert Muldoon discuss China's recent nuclear tests and agree that the Soviet Union is a common threat for both China and New Zealand. Both Mao himself and the note-takers from New Zealand make frequent mention to the Chairman's deteriorating health.

Mao Zedong and Kissinger's meeting was aimed at establishing political relations between China and the United States. They discussed the following issues: U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the differences in ideology, Western German policy towards the Soviet Union, the amount of American overseas troops, the Vietnam War, trade barriers between two nations, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the historical issues between Germany and Britain during WWII.