MAE DAP memo on prospective US-USSR INF and START negotiations, Soviet position and objectives, role of Europe in promoting an intermediate solution for INF. The paper addresses also the issue of the deployment in Western Europe of Pershing II and Cruise missiles, and discusses consultation in Atlantic Council with amb. E. Rowny on European role question in START talks.

After the installation of INF in Western Europe, NATO's focus has returned to the issue of burden sharing. The US has demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the European contribution, and pressure to strengthen European defense is mounting.

This report is part of a wide documentation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the meeting of the Atlantic Council in Brussels in December 1983. A central theme is the installation of the INF in Western Europe and the consequent interruption of the INF treaty negotiations in Geneva by the USSR.

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

An exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.

Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.

This memo to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The memo suggests that the proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm European interests.