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July 28, 1987

US District Court, 'Indictment: US of America Vs. Arshad Pervez and Inam Ul-Haq'

The indictment against Pervez and Ul-Haq included charges of conspiracy, bribery, racketeering, export violations, and false statements.

July 24, 1987

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Briefing Memorandum from Anthony Salvia to the Director, 'HFAC Asia Subcommittee Hearing on Pakistan'

A hearing by the House subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 22 July 1987 made it clear why administration officials worried about the implications of the Pervez case. With Congressman Solarz arguing that the arrest involved “a flagrant and provocative challenge to US nonproliferation objectives.”

July 23, 1983

National Security Council, Memorandum from Shirin Tahir-Kheli to Robert Oakley, 'Dealing with Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: A US Strategy'

This memorandum by a senior NSC staffer took the Pervez case seriously as a threat to aid to Pakistan that Islamabad needed to avert by making “reliable assurances on enrichment and on illegal procurement activities.”

July 23, 1987

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases'

With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

July 20, 1987

Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Solarz Amendment: Legal Memorandum for Mr. Armacost'

The Pervez case immediately raised questions among State Department lawyers about the relevance of the Solarz amendment. A final answer depended on more evidence; the lawyers wanted to see the many documents that Canadian authorities had impounded as well as the tape recordings of Pervez’s conversations with U.S. undercover agents.

July 15, 1987

Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Letter to Justice on Pakistan Export Case'

This draft of a State Department letter to the Justice Department, that was presumably sent soon thereafter, supported prosecution of Pervez to the “fullest extent of the law.”

July 16, 1987

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf, Director to the Director, 'Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

July 14, 1987

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Your Meeting with Ambassador Merker'

When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.

July 14, 1987

State Department Telegram 215122 to Embassy Islamabad, 'Maraging Steel Case: Press Guidance'

The Pervez arrest immediately raised questions in the media but the State Department would say little other than: let the legal system do its work, no speculation about Pervez’s intentions, and the admission that the Department had expressed concern to Pakistan about the “overall nature and direction of [its] nuclear program.”

May 29, 1986

Embassy Islamabad Cable 11791 to Department of State, 'Nuclear: Solarz Conversation with GOP'

The year after Congress passed the Solarz amendment in August 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-CA) traveled to Pakistan, a country that would become a major test case for the amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to recipients. Solarz confronted General Zia and other top officials with his perception, based on U.S. intelligence, that Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was enriching weapons-grade enriched uranium. The Pakistanis strenuously denied the charge.

Pagination