Bohl and Zlenko analyze the situation in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's formal dissolution. They disuss the fate of the remaining nuclear weapons and armaments in Ukraine and the prospects for their dismantlement. They also review plans for the withdrawal of "Soviet" soldiers from Germany and their return to Ukraine.

Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russia-Ukraine relations, Russian debt and finance issues, the question of Volga-Germans and the release of Honecker from the Chilean embassy.

The KGB of Ukraine provides a report to Shcherbitsky about the success of the agent "Michael," a US citizen, who has been providing the with information on US technology for thermal protection in missiles which the USSR intends to use in the development of its own missiles.

This letter is just an example of similar numerous letters which were sent to Kiev on the occasion of signing Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. In these letters the Ukrainian teachers, workers, collective farmers wrote about their happiness because of partial prohibiting of the nuclear tests. At the same time these letters condemn China, whose relations with USSR had deteriorated by that time and who prepared to perform its first atmospheric nuclear test which broke PTBT regime.

This document describes the monthly anti-nuclear campaign held in Ukraine from September to October, 1958. During this campaign, a number of mass meetings were organized. In this meetings, scientists lectured on the damage of nuclear tests and danger of nuclear war. The lecturers argued that only western states were responsible for conducting nuclear tests and initiating the nuclear arms race, and that the Soviet Union was forced to develop its nuclear capabilities to protect socialist countries, even though the Soviets support the idea of prohibiting the nuclear weapon.

In this document, Andrei Sakharov, "father" of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb program, positively assesses Oleg Lavrientiev's ideas about the Soviet thermonuclear program, which were expressed in Lavrientiev's previously-written letters to Soviet leaders.

In this document, the "father" of the first Soviet nuclear bomb, Igor Kurchatov, asks the chief of the Soviet ministry of energy, Pervukhin, to help demobilize the Ukranian physicist Veniamin Kelman, who was a fellow of UIPhT before the war. In this note Kurchatov writes about the high quality of the Ukrainian nuclear scientist and about his importance for the development of the Soviet nuclear program. This document once again demonstrates that Ukraine played a significant role in the Soviet military nuclear program.

This report, sent from the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to V.M. Molotov, informs Molotov that the project for Uranium enrichment was prepared by F. Lange and his colleagues by December, 1942. The installation of this project was planned to be produced outside of Ukraine, in a facility in Kasan.

This famous, de-classified document officially started the Soviet atomic project aimed at producing the nuclear bomb. The second point of this document orders the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to establish a plan for the project of Uranium enrichment. F. Lange, a scientist from the Ukraine Institute of Physics and Technology, was appointed as head of this project because he worked previously on theoretical aspects of Uranium enrichment.

In this letter from Victor Maslov to People's Commisar of Defence, Marshal Timoshenko, Maslov makes one final attempt to persuade Soviet leadership to start a military nuclear program, despite the strong criticism from leading Moscow scientists toward the idea.