In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”

In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements.
Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”

In this proposed agreement, Secretary of State Rusk asked the White House for authorization to approach the Soviets. Rusk had two central goals in mind: to determine if the Soviets would state whether its allies, such as China, would agree to a nonproliferation agreement and to give Moscow a “somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons.”

This State Department intelligence report touched upon a key issue for West German policy: a desire to upgrade West Germany’s nuclear role without putting it in control of nuclear weapons. According to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the West Germans faced a “dilemma” because of the development of Soviet strategic missile capabilities.

The State Department took the first step to bringing the Soviets in by sending a telegram about the nuclear suppliers' project to the embassy in Moscow.

Once Kissinger approved an approach, State Department officials prepared the substance of communications with Moscow, which included a basic five-point paper constituting proposed “undertakings” for a suppliers’ group. The proposed guidelines for nuclear exporters included no “peaceful nuclear explosives” for non-nuclear states, IAEA safeguards for nuclear supplies, and “special restraints” over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including comprehensive safeguards and multinational plants.

This memo consists of an analysis of an approach to the Soviets regarding multilateral nuclear safe guards, along with talking points which include greater supplier coordination and a suppliers' conference.

On US national security policy at the beginning of the Cold War. Includes an assessment of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as US and Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.

CIA report describing the construction process of ultra-centrifuges in the Soviet nuclear institute of Sinop and the personnel working there.