Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting the terms of nuclear warfare proposed at a NATO meeting in Athens. Whether or not to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with an atomic weapon of equal strength was debated at the meeting, as well as the role that conventional weapons would play in such a conflict.

Rossi describes the recent trend of the US Administration to want to turn away from the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, towards the acquisition of a new strategic concept that includes an increase in the "nuclear threshold." In order for Italy to continue to lead the defense of central and southeastern Europe against the Soviet Union as well as address its internal social and political crises, the United States must provide Italy with financial assistance.

Report on the United States’ development of nuclear weapons plans without consulting other NATO members and an analysis of the tensions between the United States (particularly Acheson and Herter) and Western Europe in regards to who should lead the nuclear weapons program.

Excerpts from articles on James Byrnes, General Mark W. Clark, Clement Attlee, and US refusal to share technical information about the atomic bomb.

As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

This document is related to Brosi's discussion with Acherson on NATO nuclear weaponry and strategy. Brosio underlines how the American nuclear strategy is rejected by European countries. Most of them are skeptical and take distance from Americans' willingness to use nuclear weapon against their enemies. In this sense, Acherson as representative of the American government, is ready to discuss the topic at a multilateral level.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in April 1989 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in July 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in June 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.