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October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

November 21, 1957

Letter No. 99 from the President (Syngman Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi

President Rhee briefly responds to Choi's previous reported opinions on Korean unification and the threat of Red China and Japan.

January 21, 1954

Letter, General James A. Van Fleet to President Rhee

General Van Fleet first addresses the two sides of the Asian question. Should the US 1) try to “win back Asia” or 2) face the "reality" of the present conditions and should not recommence fighting in Korea? He advises Rhee to concentrate on expanding the ROK army and to leave reunification matters to the US and the United Nations.

March 4, 1954

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Van Fleet

President Rhee once again suggests that the US government should increase the ROK defense forces. It will not only be cheaper to fund Korean (over American) divisions, it also means that Americans do not need to fight in Korea. Rhee then negotiates that if the US government implements the necessary military buildup aid, he too will not take any “unilateral action” for or against the future Geneva Conference until after it has been in session. Finally, Rhee advocates his disapproval of US interest to build up Japan.

May 3, 1951

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Coulter

President Rhee writes to General Coulter to address the issue of prisoners of war. After stating that releasing POWs would “demoralize” Korean soldiers, Rhee expresses his concern for POWs forced to fight in the North’s side. Rhee states that “democratic-accepting” POWs can be released only after they pass a series of tests proving them to be anti-communist. Once released, these POWs can “carry their stories of fair treatment under a democratic United Nations.”

April 18, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76137, TOP SECRET, April 18, 1967

The remarks of a Vietnamese diplomat on the incidents between South and North Korea, who explains that the South and North exploit tensions for their own political agendas.