In this letter, Zhukov sets out how, from the Soviet perspective, the Soviets have been working towards peace but the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe derailed arms control talks in Geneva and has made the international situation markedly worse. He invites the CND to work with the Soviet Union "to further our common struggle for a nuclear-free Europe."

This memorandum, signed by Yurii Andropov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB); Nikolai Shchelokov, the Minister of Public Order (whose ministry was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late November 1968); and Mikhail Molyarov, the Procurator of the USSR, was sent to the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) eleven days after the demonstration in Red Square against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The document lays out the basic facts of the case as viewed by the KGB and the CPSU. The document mentions the names of the eight activists who were in Red Square as well as two who helped with planning but were not actually in Red Square, Inna Korkhova and Maiya Rusakovskaya. Natal’ya Gorbanevskaya, one of the eight, was detained but released because she had recently given birth. However, a year later she was arrested in connection with her involvement and sentenced to a harsh term in a psychiatric prison.

In a speech delivered at a meeting of the KGB, Andropov discusses the results of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the state of Soviet intelligence work, and suggests areas of improvement in KGB intelligence work in light of heightened international tensions.

Appointment of Soviet officials for discussion of the procedure for joint border monitoring of trains and passengers crossing the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.

A report from KGB Chairman Andropov to the Central Committee of the CPSU assessing the status of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in their “transition” period and measures that might be taken to weaken them. It alleges that RFE and RL are planning subversive actions against the USSR at the Munich Olympics. It credits the Soviet bloc intelligence services with increasing the problems of the Radios. The document indicates timely KGB knowledge of internal RL documents such as the March 15, 1971 revision of the Radio Liberty Policy Manual.

KGB Chairman Andropov and East German Minister for State Security Mielke meet to discuss ongoing Stasi/KGB cooperation and international affairs. Topics of conversation include the Ronald Reagan administration, the Polish Solidarity Crisis,

Contains information on KGB active measures to undermine the activities and credibility of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America during the mid 1970’s and early 1980’s. In one operation, personally authorized by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, the Spanish journal “Arriba” and 42 other Spanish journals published articles stating that Radio Liberty broadcasts into the USSR violated the Helsinki Accords because they impinged upon Soviet sovereignty, and were contrary to Spanish national interests. Following this activity, the Spanish leadership decided not to extend its agreement with the US which allowed Radio Liberty to broadcast from Spain. During a 1976 operation, an East German agent who worked as an international lawyer spread disinformation about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty’s ‘illegal’ activities in 35 foreign embassies in Vienna. In October 1977, the KGB sent letters to a variety of Western news outlets, including the Washington Post, claiming to be from a group of Radio Free Europe employees. These letters were directed specifically at US Senators Edward Kennedy, Charles Percy, and Frank Church, and Representatives Edward Derwinsky, Clement Zablocky, Herman Badillo, and Berkley Bedell. In 1981, with the help of the journal “Pravda,” the KGB exposed the role of Radio Liberty in the ‘events’ in Poland.

The parties agree to work together in protecting their soldiers from ideological diversion by anti-socialist agents and to continue exchanging information gathered by military counter-intelligence.

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

The Czechoslovak and Soviet security branches agreed to cooperate in the acquisition of documents and the sharing of information on hostile persons. The two parties committed to favorable relations within international organizations and joint counter-intelligence measures, articulating a focus on improving intelligence and counter-intelligence on the U.S. and its allies and China. Both parties vow to assist each other in illegal intelligence work and in the counter-intelligence monitoring of persons working for embassies, international firms or otherwise engaged in economic relations. The Czechoslovaks and Soviets agree to coordinate actions before providing assistance to security programs in developing countries, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Vietnamese Socialist Republic.