Skip to content

Results:

1 - 6 of 6

Documents

April 3, 1979

Information about the Results of the Official Friendly Visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of This Year)

This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.

October 25, 1962

Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle

Ambassador Max Troendle discusses the situation in the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis in regards to the public opinion and press attacks now being much calmer. He also mentions Israel’s newly arrived ambassador, Joseph Tekoah, who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America from his own experience.

October 25, 1962

Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli

A political letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli describing aspects of the Soviet position on the Cuban crisis and how "It seems that on Cuba, the Soviets want to avoid meeting the American challenge, that they want to negotiate, talk, and not to face a showdown."

November 14, 1962

West German Record of One-on-One Conversation between FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington

F.R.G. Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. President Kennedy discuss the Cuban crisis and the sense they both have that the situation is not yet entirely resolved. "The President indicates that one never knows what’s going on in the Soviets’ heads. The Americans never thought that the Soviets would dare bring missiles to Cuba and the Soviets never thought that the Americans would react so decisively. Both sides had false ideas about each other…"

October 26, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov, Bonn

A discussion between Federal Minister Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Smirnow [Smirnov] in which Smirnov presents to the minister a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the aggressive acts the United States had committed against the Republic of Cuba. In this statement the Soviet Government was explaining its view on the blockade the United States had imposed on Cuba. It also commented on the other aggressive steps President Kennedy intended to take against Cuba as announced on 22 October.

October 23, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dean Acheson, Special Envoy of US President Kennedy, Bonn, West Germany

A conversation between Federal Chancellor Adenauer with the Special Adviser of the U.S. President, Acheson. They discuss plans to destabilize the Cuban regime by domestic unrest, how the missile bases in Cuba should be destroyed, Russian soldiers stationed in Cuba and the lasting impact of the Bay of Pigs landing.