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Documents

May 24, 1953

Sample Plan for the Draft Response to the Notes of the Three Powers

Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.

May 5, 1953

Vladimir Semyonov, 'Memorandum on the German Question'

Memorandum on Soviet policy regarding German unification including meetings with the United States, England, and France on an All-German Conference and need for future discussion. Also addressed is Soviet relations with East Germany in the forms of military assistance and economic aid for reparations.

July 30, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 30 July 1960

Puzanov and Pak Geum-cheol exchange their opinions on the Soviet-North Korean relationship, Soviet economic aid toward North Korea, and North Korea's policies toward South Korea.

September 25, 1953

Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

September 27, 1946

Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership

Soviet Ambassador to the US, Nikolai Novikov, describes the advent of a more assertive US foreign policy. Novikov cautions the Soviet leadership that the Truman administration is bent on imposing US political, military and economic domination around the world. This telegram has, since its discovery in the Russian archives, been labelled the Soviet equivalent of US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan's "Long telegram."

May 8, 1953

USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum, 'On Further Soviet Government Measures Pertaining to the German Question'

Memorandum from the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry on Soviet foreign policy options with regard to the German Question. The memorandum looks at the effects on Soviet policy toward the western powers in the context of the Postdam conference and at the future state of the Soviet-East German relations.

January 21, 1954

Report on the Reception of Yugoslavian Diplomat Vidic by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov

Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Yugoslav Ambassador Vidic. Topics of discussion include Austrian-Yugoslav relations, and the current state of relations with the Soviet Union. This memorandum was written one year after the Tito-Stalin split, and the founding of Titoism.

November 8, 1956

Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the UCY on the events in Hungary

In this letter, the Central Committee of Yugoslavia responds to the CC CPSU over questions concerning Yugoslavia’s decision to provide shelter to Nagy and his group at their embassy. The letter begins by expressing agreement on the weakness of Nagy’s government, the need to form a new government under Kadar, and the existence of “honest communists” in Nagy’s government that could assist Kadar. The letter relates that Yugoslavia cannot hand Nagy and his group over to authorities because of the domestic consequences of such an action. The correspondence ends with both the suggestion of amnesty for Nagy and Yugoslavia’s disavowal of any connection to Nagy or the uprising.