The CIA assesses that the Chinese leadership is taking a more confrontational stance in order to win concessions from the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan.

The United States' interests in its relationships with China and Taiwan would be best served if Beijing and Taipei could reach some form of accommodation or association that would permit the two parts of China to coexist peacefully. The worst outcome would be a military confrontation that forced the United States to choose whether to provide .assistance to Taiwan or to allow it to be overwhelmed by superior Chinese force. Trends over the past four years have moved fitfully toward an eventual accommodation, and they probably will continue in this direction.

The Central Intelligence Agency assesses that Chinese leaders do not believe that they can achieve reunification in the near future, but that they remain determined to erode US support for Taiwan and want to draw Washington into a more direct role in promoting negotiations.

The National Intelligence Officer for East Asia briefs the Director of Central Intelligence on China and Taiwan policy for an upcoming meeting with the secretaries of state and defense.

The CIA evaluates Deng Xiaoping's views on Taiwan and how we will likely calibrate PRC policy toward the island.

A CIA memo anticipating what Deng Xiaoping might say about Taiwan when meeting with US President Reagan in late April 1984. 

A CIA assessment of Chinese views of the United States and areas of both alignment and divergence with US policy and interests.

In anticipation of a visit by Zhao Ziyang to East Germany, the Ambassador of the GDR in Beijing reports on China's economic reforms, the leadership within the Chinese Communist Party, and China's relations with the GDR, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.