Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

January 20, 1965

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES, WARSAW

This document was made possible with support from the Carnegie Corporation

CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
  • Citation

    get citation

    Romanian meeting minutes of Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting concerning non-proliferation.
    "Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Warsaw," January 20, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, fond CC of RCP-Directorate of International Affairs, folder 15/1965, pp. 112-127. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113838
  • share document

    https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113838

VIEW DOCUMENT IN

English HTML

Meeting of the First Secretaries of the Communist and Workers Parties and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WP) Member Nations at the Central Committee (CC) of the Polish United Worker’s Party (PUWP), morning of 20 January 1965

(summary of discussions)

Participating: T. Zhivkov [Bu], A. Novotny and J. Lenart [Cz], W. Ulbricht and W. Stoph [GDR], W. Gomulka and J. Cyrankiewicz [Po], Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and Cde. I. G. Maurer [Ro], J. Kádár [Hu], L. Brezhnev and A. Kosygin [USSR].

 

Cde. Gomulka begun by greeting the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the political parties and the presidents of the council of ministers of the Warsaw Pact member countries [present] at the CC of the PUWP.

This meeting—said Cde. Gomulka—was organized as a result of a request by some of the delegates present at the meeting. There is no agenda for discussion, but [he proposed that] an exchange of opinions take place on the following subjects:

  1. Issues on which the Preparatory Committee could not reach an agreement and which have been forwarded to our meeting to be discussed and decided. First and foremost this refers to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, the Romanian comrades objected to including it in the communiqué.
  2. Issues which require that the conference take a position on, issues which come out of the speeches given yesterday by the participants. It was requested that the conference adopts the decision—which will be under the format of a suggestion to the respective governments—to require the deputy foreign ministers to meet periodically at least twice a year.
  3. Issues which the Preparatory Committee did not discuss until the evening of 19 January of this year:
  1. the meeting of the Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Treaty United Armed Forces (UAFor).
  2. The issue of establishing a command staff of C/A For.
  3. The letter to be sent to the Albanian government in response to their letter addressed to the conference. The reply, which should have [no more] than two sentences, should take note of the invitation addressed [by the organization] to the Albanian government, their refusal [to participate] and that the future participation of the People’s Republic of Albania in the Warsaw Pact depends [solely] on the discretion of the Albanian government.

Following that, Cde. Gomulka asked Cdes. Dej and Maurer to reassess the Romanian position with regard to the issue of non-proliferation and to accept the inclusion of the passage regarding that issue in the text of the final communiqué, [which] had been accepted by all other participants.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: We have made clear, during our speech, the Romanian position with regard to the issue for which we have convened here specifically that we take position against the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) of NATO, and to oppose first of all West German access to nuclear weapons. Finally [we arrived] during our discussions with Cde. Gomulka and Cde. Ulbricht, we have expressed our fear that, at the present [and] given the current situation, from a tactical standpoint, it would be counter-productive to raise the issue of non-proliferation. We do not want to allow other nations such as India to use our bringing the issue in front of the UN to obtain in this international body [the People’s Republic of] China’s condemnation. It would be better if, for such an action of [obvious] international interest, we were able to depend on the accord and support of the other socialist countries [such as] China, [North] Korea, [North] Vietnam, Yugoslavia, [the support] of all Socialist countries. Only in this way could we ensure the desired efficiency for our action.

With regard to the draft treaty proposed by the GDR delegation we cannot take a position since we received it 24 hours before the delegation departed for Warsaw. Issues such as these, which implicated the [Romanian] state and government in the international arena, can only be decided upon by the competent forums of party and government.

We believe it is important that we concentrate our entire force on the issue at hand: namely opposing the creation, in whatever form, of the MLF so that FRG access to nuclear weapons is not permitted. These are our decisions, of which we make alone, and which, in our opinion, deserve attention. I ask the comrades to show some understanding for [the considerations] raised by us on this issue and to agree that this issue of non-proliferation not be included in the communiqué.

Cde. W. Ulbricht: Through the creation of MLF, the primary issue [of concern] becomes the action of a US-FRG nuclear bloc. The plans for the creation of MLF or the Allied Nuclear Forces (ANF) represent the real danger for the continual proliferation of nuclear weapons. This [danger] applies first of all to the other NATO states, but also other countries such as India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Israel.

The treaty proposed by the GDR is written in such a way that it cannot be used against the People’s Republic of China. The GDR delegation made this proposal considering the new policy which was created after the 1964 session of the NATO Council. At that time, a series of new aspects, unknown before, came to light, regarding NATO strategy and tactics with regard to war preparations against the member nations of the Warsaw Pact and first of all against the GDR. These very facts emboldened the GDR delegation to make these new proposals and to suggest that the issue of non-proliferation be discussed at the future UN General Assembly. The GDR delegation believes this the right time since there is no agenda set for the UNGA. Furthermore, this will allow the socialist countries to take the initiative and prevent other nations from using [this issue] against China.

Cde. I. G. Maurer: The nuclear issue, [the issue] for which we have gathered here is that, as the treaties signed after the Second World War, West Germany should not be allowed to rearm, to gain nuclear weapons. This is the main issue at the time and this is what we need to take a decision on.

Cde. W. Ulbricht: Not to acknowledge the danger presented by the continual proliferation of nuclear weapons is to invite nuclear war not to prevent it. The absence from the communiqué of the issue of non-proliferation will cause a great deal of confusion among the opponents of nuclear armament. To limit the danger of proliferation only to the FRG—or only to the NATO countries—would [drastically] reduce the propaganda effectiveness and power of our position. This is why we ask that the Romanian comrades agree with the inclusion in the final communiqué of the paragraph concerning non-proliferation.

Cde. W. Gomulka: The creation of MLF is, after all, proliferation. As far as I am concerned, they are identical. Thus, when we take a position against MLF, we take a position against continual proliferation of nuclear weapons. To commit the issue of non-proliferation only to the FRG would however put major constraints on the issue. This issue does not only pertain to the FRG, but also to other NATO countries, which might [thus] gain access to nuclear weapons.

If we are to limit ourselves to the issue of NATO, the [international] public opinion will accuse us of political double-talk. We cannot oppose MLF in NATO without, by default, being against non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general. With regard to this issue [of non-proliferation] our countries adopted a series of decisions some time ago, which means we are not saying anything new…Or do you believe those other decisions to be invalid now?

Cde. G. Gheorghiu-Dej: We believe there is no need to repeat those decisions at this time when, based on our sources, they will be used to publicly condemn the People’s Republic of China.

Cde. W. Gomulka: As for us the problem of the bringing up of non-proliferation at the UNGA is concerned, this [proposal] is already out there. Just today we received information, which states that Iceland, Sweden, Norway, the US, and a few other countries made such a proposal to the UN. The issue, it is now clear, is out there. We can [however] ask ourselves: what are the UN’s interests in joining a non-proliferation proposal? It is clear that since this idea is so popular with international public opinion that the US, to hide the aggressive character of its [foreign] policy, is trying to present itself as a supporter of non-proliferation. What our Romanian comrades brought up regarding India [‘s position] is an enormous hurdle which can be overcome easily through our common action at the UN.

It is true that the draft treaty presented by our German comrades cannot be adopted at the present time. [However] we can take, in principle, the position of raising the issue at the UN, which the draft treaty is being studied by our respective institutions empowered [to deal with this]. We have [adopted] a program, written and adopted unanimously, which sets as objectives stopping all nuclear tests, making the use and the development [fabrication] of nuclear weapons illegal, and complete and general disarmament. We should ask ourselves: which of these, the goals of the active international socialist community, are the most easily accomplishable?

It is quite clear that the issue regarding making the use of nuclear weapons illegal will be difficult to accomplish since, at this time, the West does not accept this proposal.

Our goals concerning the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are, of all issues regarding disarmament, the easiest to reach. [If] we take a position in favor of this we stand to gain a lot in our propaganda ability with the international public opinion. If we do not take a decision to this end, people will not be able to understand our position.

The majority of the comrades have, through their speeches yesterday, made clear their support for this position. Please, Cde. Dej, Cde. Maurer, [please] accept the proposal to include the issue of non-proliferation in the [final] communiqué.

Cde. I. G. Maurer: Cde. Gomulka had spent a great deal of energy and [displayed] flawless logic to prove things already known. It is obvious that the creation of MLF is proliferation. It is [also] clear that no matter how a country obtains nuclear weapons [that] is also proliferation. We believe however that, at this time, we [all] have to take a position against this very kind of proliferation, such as MLF or other similar proposals through which, first and foremost the FRG would obtain nuclear weapons.

Cde. Novotny: I would like to ask our Romanian comrades a question. It is a well-known fact that the Western media expects Romania to adopt at this meeting a different position then the rest of the socialist countries. If we do not include in the communiqué the idea of non-proliferation it will be apparent to all [observers] that Romania did not agree [with the proposal].

If we do not take a stand supporting non-proliferation, then the international public opinion and first of all the communist parties from other countries [than those present here] will not understand. [T]hey will ask themselves if our position has not changed.

Will the Romanian comrades repeat, before the international public opinion, the same thing they are saying here, namely that they oppose talking about non-proliferation?

It is well-known the interest with which the international public opinion, all progressive people, awaits that our conference will take, once again, a stand against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Cde. I.G. Maurer: I do not understand the question. If it refers to the Romanian position [vis-à-vis non-proliferation], these [positions] are set by the [party and state] institutions responsible for its implementation. Romania can, at ay time and in any place, justify its position, using arguments it considers appropriate [to the situation].

Cde. I. Kádár: The central issue of our meeting is our position with regard to the creation of MLF and, connected to this, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. [When] we condemn the attempt to create MLF we, at the same time, condemn the continual proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today there are five nuclear powers, the US, Great Britain, the USSR, China, and France. To continue the fight against imperialism at present means, after all, to fight against proliferation, [against] the US plans. If we do not prevent proliferation we will open a back door for many years, and, even in the short-term, J-6 capitalist countries will posses nuclear weapons. Thus, [nuclear weapons] will become a weapon in the hands of the imperialist [forces]. This is why the communiqué looks at the issue justly.

With respect to the discussions at the UN regarding this, there is nothing we can do to prevent this. Today the PAP [ID] news agency sent out a wire announcing that the British government will submit a proposal at the UN regarding non-proliferation. In regard to India we, [the socialist countries] can discuss [with them] and convince them to give up making a proposal directed against the Chinese.

We would also like to discuss this [issue] with the Chinese comrades. In the past, at [the meetings of] our Organization, the other socialist countries participated as observers. This no longer takes place and that is not a good thing.

We suggest that an information note be sent to the other socialist countries, those not members of the Warsaw Pact, through which to inform them of the issues discussed at the meeting. [Of] course, not as [summarily] as in the communiqués, but in more detail.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghia-Dej suggested that we delete the passage about non-proliferation from the text of the communiqué. I would like to suggest that we rewrite the passage taking into considerations the Romanian position: “the nuclear powers will not use nuclear weapons and will not make these available to other states.”

Cde. T. Zhivkov: We believe that the disagreements we are now having are the consequences of some [earlier] misunderstandings. At out meeting we have concentrated [our attention] on the attempts of proliferation of nuclear weapons to other Western powers, and, specifically, the FRG. Can we, after all, accept this situation when the number of countries which possess nuclear weapons is growing? It is self-evident that we must counter-attack such places by publicizing our stand against proliferation, against the MLF.

The strategy and tactics [of our fight] in the issue of disarmament have been collectively elaborated by the Communist and Workers’ parties, and have been part of the documents adopted by the 1957 and [World] Conferences [of Communist and Workers’ Parties]. This is where our strength comes from, this gives us the ability to gather around us the largest following in our fight against the dangers of war.

If we will not include in the communiqué a reference to the idea of non-proliferation, it will be unclear what we are fighting for. The question can then be raised; is the fight against MLF justified?

The communique is written in a lackluster tone. But what we need is a document able to mobilize [international public opinion], which will [missing word] in our struggle.

I would like to ask Cdes. Dej and Maurer to understand that it is necessary to include this issue [non-proliferation] in the communiqué, to make this proposal at the UN. Otherwise, we will be isolated. As we already know, there are a number of initiatives on this topic proposed at the UN.

We should not renounce the ideas elaborated and adopted by our parties. The international situation is, at present, favorable for discussing the issue of non-proliferation.

Cde. L. Brezhnev: Before I express the position of our delegation. I would like to pose two questions to the Romanian comrades, so their own position will be clear: Is the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) position vis-à-vis non-proliferation in general favorable to this idea? Or do the Romanian comrades tie their own position to this issue to reaching an accord with the other socialist countries? It is very important that we clearly understand the position of the Romanian comrades, which I [personally] did not quite grasp yet.

It is possible that the RWP is, generally, against proliferation but that is considers the present timing for making this position public inopportune. It is also possible that the Romanian comrades are tying their position to an agreement with the other socialist countries [on this issue]. Then this is an entirely different thing. If a socialist country, let’s say, will be against our position…

Cde. Gh. Gheorghia-Dej: Which country?

Cde. I.G. Maurer: [He means] China, of course.

Cde. L. Brezhnev: If a socialist country will oppose [our proposal] then what are we to do? Give up on our idea? This is why I would like to hear, once again, the principled position of the RWP with regard to [the issue of] non-proliferation.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghia-Dej: We support non-proliferation, non-proliferation, non-proliferation. We can repeat this as many times as you wish so that it is understood. This is the principled position of our party. We have taken a position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons countless times. What we do not want is that [our position] be used by someone, even if [that someone] is a country like India—with which we have good relations—to condemn the People’s Republic of China. What we want is to receive assurances, before we take this step, that we will not spark criticism in our own camp. We should have consultations with the Chinese, the [North] Koreans, others as well. I firmly believe that they will support our position. After all, the People’s Republic of China declared that they too oppose the creation of the MLF, that they are behind the GDR [in its struggle] against the FRG. I am convinced that we will reach a position resolving this problem. But we need to consult [the others], to discuss [this issue]. Why are we in such a hurry?

Cde. Brezhnev: I’d say that our meeting is being held at a moment of great responsibility, just as I said in my speech yesterday. We can all see that, even though [we had] some partial success, the imperialists are continuing with their intense preparations for war. Not to take note of this real danger, I repeat, real danger, is to display a great deal of naiveté. It is significant to remember how the preparations for World War II took place. [We] see the same things are attempted now. We cannot resign in front of these facts. The idea of non-proliferation has gained support in all the [social] strata in the world.

I do not believe that there is one communist, one progressive man in this world who would dare say that he supports the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is why it is so important that we do not drag ourselves behind public opinion, but that we show initiative. If we do not tackle the problem [of non-proliferation] in the Communique it is [equivalent to] showing cowardice. And, since we are here among [friends], among communists, I will speak freely and say that, to adopt the position as our Romanian comrades are doing, would mean to procrastinate in our fight against the danger of war. This is why we must understand our responsibility [in this issue]. We must find out who are those [countries] interested in continual nuclear proliferation. It might very well be that, as a response to the western plans of proliferation, we will decide that other socialist countries should possess nuclear weapons. But where will this take us? I am convinced that this would only lead to economic hardships, to spiritual and economic expenses without any reason, which will land heavily on the shoulders of these nations. We [the Soviets] in our own Presidium, have discussed this issue many times, and I can assure you that each member of the Presidium and each of the CC [CPSU] secretaries have made there positions clear. After this very in-depth discussion, we decided that we must, once again, make our position with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons known to the international public opinion. The Romanian comrades said that they too are against [nuclear] proliferation but that their position has certain nuances which forces them to oppose at this time the inclusion of the passage [on non-proliferation] in the text of the communique. Considering that, the general trend, the RWP supports the idea of non-proliferation if the other socialist countries agree, then we have a whole different situation.

We believe that we must include the issue of non-proliferation in the communique. We can maybe discuss the language of the passage, but the idea must be included in the communique.

As for us bringing the issue to discussion at the UN, we could decide right here how to proceed: our delegations, present [here] at the conference, could raise the issue at the UN in their role as members of the organization, without making reference to the Warsaw Treaty. After all, in that regard there are already a number of discussions by other countries. But maybe those are no longer valid?

Cde. I.G. Maurer: We are not saying that [those previous discussions] are no longer valid, but neither are we saying that they still are. At this time, our position is that the issue of non-proliferation is neutral as far as we are concerned.

Why must we tie the fight against the MLF, against nuclear arming of the FRG, to a much more general problem, a problem that is concerning other [socialist] countries as well—the issue of non-proliferation? Why should we do such a thing without being assured before that this step will aid us in the problem we have gathered here to address: the nuclear arming of the FRG? Why should we take this step before we know what is the position of the other socialist countries, before we know if they will support our position? [Keep in mind that] if these are socialist countries that will not lend us support, then our position will be weakened.

Moreover in this issue we are not only interested in [the opinions] of socialist states, but also in [the support of] capitalist countries, even [economically] developed capitalist countries. There are some advanced capitalist countries who oppose the creation of the MLF, even if they might not lend their support behind the issue of non-proliferation. For example France is an active champion of the fight against MLF, even inside NATO. But we should ask [ourselves] is France behind the idea of non-proliferation? If France does not support [the idea] of non-proliferation, would we not weaken the agreement we [could] have with France on fighting against MLF.

And something more. Recently, the UN Secretary General carried out an investigation at the UN, asking all countries to state their positions regarding nuclear arming. From the 114 members nations of the UN only half answered back and of these only half were against proliferation. This is something that we need to consider when preparing a proposal which does not only concern the Warsaw Pact member states, but all other countries.

In our opinion, [nuclear] non-proliferation makes sense only as far as it represents the beginning of a process, being tied to the process of nuclear disarmament, the forbidding the use of nuclear weapons, the destruction of the nuclear stockpiles. Only in this way can non-proliferation be a step forward in the struggle against the danger of nuclear war. Non-proliferation as “an end in itself,” when it is not tied to these [other] measures, will only lead to nuclear monopolies. [T]he continual existence of nuclear weapons is not touched, and, thus, the danger of a nuclear war is not averted.

It is imperative, before [any action is taken], that we reach an agreement with the other socialist countries on the context in which we treat non-proliferation and only after that we should publicly reveal this powerful, rallying message. Why must we decide here and now this issue? Will we lose something if we are to bring this up after we have consulted with the other socialist countries?

Cde. L. Brezhnev: You see, it is a different problem when you put it this way. This is exactly why I asked you to make your position regarding non-proliferation clear at the beginning. If we are to tie [to it] all these aspects of disarmament, as you do, then it will be difficult for us to get even partial results.

Cde. A. Novotny: I asked before some questions so that we can be completely clear on Romania’s position with regard to non-proliferation. Now it is clear that the Romanian comrades support [the concept of] non-proliferation. At the same time however, they are against including this issue in the Communiqué. This is however an issue of political principles. We cannot pronounce ourselves against the nuclear arming of the FRG without at the same time taking position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The current international situation is favorable to such a position. In one or two months the situation will change. I agree that the passage suggested by Cde. Kádár should be included in the Communiqué.

As far as bringing this up at the UN, we could agree that our governments should examine this issue before a certain date. [H]owever, earlier is better. We were already informed that other countries brought this up at the UN.

On a different issue, we must say that all our countries are having problems as far as economic development is concerned. The greatest share of expenses for the defense of our countries is borne by the Soviet Union. If we are to compare our [economic] capacity with that of the capitalist countries, we will see that the latter have greater capabilities to obtain nuclear weapons. [I am] referring, of course, to the FRG, Italy, Spain, Japan and others. As times goes by, it will be harder for us to bank on a success in the issue of non-proliferation, since the number of countries possessing nuclear capabilities will grow, especially as far as capitalist countries go. This is why we believe that this is the right moment for our countries to take the initiative in the issue of non-proliferation, that [this issue] must be included in the communiqué.

I hope that the Romanian comrades will not get upset, but we believe that their position is not justified. The Western media knows what we are discussing here, and if we do not take a position on the issue of non-proliferation then this will be interpreted as due to our lack of unity on the issue. [Even] if the Romanian comrades do not want the issue of non-proliferation to be raised at the UN, this cannot prevent the other states that want to raise the issue there to do so, as members of the organization. This is their right.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: But is it not interesting that even the US, through [Secretary of State, Dean] Rusk, has taken a position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons? We should think about this.

Cde. A. Kosygin: With respect to the issue discussed, I would like to point out [to all of us] the current military situation, which, more so than ever, demands that we close ranks, so that we can lean one on the other.

As far as what Rusk said, this is not quite that way. I too spoke with Rusk, and I know how he understands non-proliferation. He contends that the very creation of MLF means limits on the number of nuclear powers. Our position is opposite to this, that [MLF] represents a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the draft of the Communiqué, which has been approved [negotiated] by the experts, the [passage on non-proliferation] is written in such as way that it could, I believe, be acceptable to our Romanian comrades.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: Let us see that. Is that the final draft of the communiqué?

Cde. W. Gomulka: It is the final draft which the experts approved last night and which I received at 9:30 this morning, before our meeting.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: This is exactly why we ask that you let us see it so that we may state our opinion. Since we are to meet again at 4:00 PM, maybe we should drop the other issues in discussion, and concentrate on the communiqué.

Cde. W. Gomulka: But we still have to discuss a number of issues. For example, the German comrades proposed that we adopt an internal regulation that our deputy foreign ministers be required to meet periodically for discussions. All the comrades have expressed their approval with this idea; we still do not know what is the opinion of the Romanian comrades.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: We have stated our position with respect to the creation of new institutions, outside those that already exist within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We cannot understand what good would those [new] institutions do. Why must we decide that a permanent forum of the deputy foreign ministers be created, since we all know that [the deputy foreign ministers] cannot make any decisions without a green light from the leadership of the party and state?  

Cde. I. G. Maurer: After all, it is the party and the government that take decisions in our countries.

Cde. W. Gomulka: But this is not an institution that we are creating. This is about regular meetings, at least twice a year, for consultations between the deputy foreign ministers. This is not an independent institution; it will not replace the Political Consultative Committee.

Cde. I. G. Maurer: But if we are to formulate a set of laws governing its activity, a work method, if we make certain things required through our decision, that, whether we name it so or not, this will be a permanent institution [of the Warsaw Treaty Organization].

We have replied to a similar proposal made by Cde. Khrushchev and we have showed, at the time, why we oppose the creation of such an institution. We do not see any reason compelling us to change our position.

Cde. L. Brezhnev: There was no proposal forwarded to create a new institution within the Warsaw Pact. The proposal was referring to more frequent, better-organized consultations. This is why we agree with the proposal made by our German comrades, which we consider useful in the drive to improve our productivity.

Cde. W. Ulbricht: You, Cde. Dej, have made clear your desire for more frequent consultations between not only the Warsaw pact member nations, but all socialist countries. I do not understand why you are so against adopting a internal decision which will require the deputy foreign ministers to meet twice a year for consultations. In the past 2-3 years these types of consultations were very sporadic. Furthermore, this is happening at a time when the Western powers are strengthening their collaboration.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: Until now we had organized these consultations whenever it was necessary. We can continue to have such meetings from now on as well, of course when it is considered necessary [by all] and under the condition that the agenda of discussions will be made clear [beforehand]. The documents should be sent beforehand, not as it was done this time, with only 24 hours before our departure to Warsaw. This is the issue we need to address, and not the creation of an institution, [or] taking a[n] [internal] decision.

Meetings can take place without any conditions regarding the level of representation. We have adopted a decision in 1961, I hope you all remember, regarding the level of representation of one country—Albania—present at one of our meetings. You can consider this our self-criticism, but [we believe] that this should never happen again.

Cde. W. Gomulka: But why can we not adopt an internal decision? We are after all an organization that could, in the interest of its own productivity, adopt decisions which it considers necessary.

Cde. W. Ulbricht: Then, what would you say if we were to decide now that in June 1965 the ministers of foreign affairs should meet to prepare the documents regarding the issue of European Security, and, in July 1965, we hold a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee to discuss this issue?

Cde. J. Kádár: All the comrades, including the Romanian comrades have underlined the need for a more systematic consultation among us. Presently it takes about 5-7 weeks until we reach agreement on one issue. I believe that we can adopt an internal decision that would set some rules on this issue. I would like to suggest that each year the ministers of foreign affairs meet between 20 and 30 August to agree on [our countries’] position on the UN General Assembly agenda. It would also be possible that the ministers meet also at the beginning of March. The foreign affairs ministers in the NATO countries are meeting for consultations; so do the foreign ministers of the Arab nations, so do the ones in Latin America. We are the only ones that do not organize such meetings. Why? What is happening at this session is a shameful thing for us all. Why can we not meet more often and discuss issues of mutual concern.

Cde. W. Gomulka: All comrades present are in agreement with the exception of the Romanian comrades.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: We do not and will not agree with the creation of any new institutions in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We can consult without a permanent institution.

Cde. W. Gomulka: Then we still have to discuss the issue of the creation of the General Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. All the comrades present have stated their support for this issue. What is the position of the Romanian comrades?

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: We do not have a mandate to discuss this issue [at this time]. We will return home and will bring this up for discussion in the empowered leadership forums. [Only] after that can we give you an opinion.

Cde. W. Gomulka: Then we have nothing further to discuss.

Comrades, I would like to thank all of you for your participation at this open, comradely discussion. Since time has flown by, I suggest that the afternoon meeting be moved from 5:00 PM to 4:00 PM. (All agree)

I would like to propose that we raise a glass for the success of our meeting, for further successes in your activity.

(Cde. Brezhnev, clinking glasses with Cde. Dej: It is a shame that we could not decide on the issue of a General Staff. The generals were really hoping that this will be solved at this time).

Discussions begun at 10:00 AM and lasted until 1:45 PM.

ORIGINAL SCAN PDF

It appears your Web browser is not configured to display PDF files. No worries, just click here to download the PDF file.

Click here to view the PDF file in a new window.

PDFs cannot be printed inline in the page. To print a PDF, you must first download the file and open it in a PDF viewer.