July 18, 1995
Memorandum: Situation in former Yugoslavia, here: The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 17 July 1995
J. Bitterlich Bonn, den 18. Juli 1995
V e r m e r k
Betr.: Lageentwicklung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien; hier: Telefonat des Bundeskanzlers mit PM Major am 17.07.1995[1]
Aus dem 10minütigen Telefonat halte ich im wesentlichen fest:
-PM Major erläutert, daß Lage sich verschlechtert habe, Frankreich überreagiere, Srebrenica sei weg, das gleiche gelte sehr bald für Zepa. Er gehe davon aus, daß die Serben dann versuchen werden, Goradzde zu nehmen, wo 200 britische Soldaten seien. Am wichtigsten für die weitere Entwicklung sei aber Sarajewo. In dieser Lage stellten sich zwei Fragen:
- Wo solle und müsse der Westen die Linie ziehen? In Goradzde oder in Sarajewo?
- Wie weit sind wir vorbereitet, uns vom derzeitigen peace keeping zu einer Parteinahme hin zu bewegen?
Er hoffe, daß die Konferenz am Freitag insoweit vermöge, Klarheit zu schaffen oder zumindest hierfür einen Beginn einzuleiten. Eine Veränderung des bisherigen Vorgehens habe tiefgreifende Konsequenzen: Wenn man Goradzde schützen wolle, dann müsse man ziemlich viele Truppen zusätzlich dorthin verbringen. Dies bedeute, man werde sich mit Serbien im Krieg befinden - mit allen Folgerungen für die Entwicklung an anderen Orten wie insbesondere in Sarajewo. Wenn man Goradzde verteidigen wolle, stelle sich die Frage, wie die Truppen dorthin kämen. Dies könne mit klaren Risiken per Luftbrücke erfolgen, allerdings ohne schwere Waffen, was die Risiken für die Verteidiger zusätzlich beträchtlich erhöhe. Schwere Waffen könne man nur durch Kampf gegen die Serben hinbringen.
In bezug auf Sarajewo sei es möglich, einen Zugang über den Berg Igman freizumachen, ggf. ihn freizukämpfen - allerdings handle es sich um einen reinen Sommerweg. Wenn man Sarajewo durch Gewalt schütze, bestehe die Gefahr der Geiselnahme an anderen Orten.
Man stehe vor der Entscheidung zwischen drei Optionen:
(1) Abzug von Unprofor
(2) Fortsetzung von Unprofor ("to find a suitable way to continue Unprofor, even if unsatisfactory")
(3) übergang von peace keeping zum peace enforcing mit der Konsequenz des Krieges gegen die bosnischen Serben.
Der Bundeskanzler dankt für die Erläuterungen und verweist darauf, daß über (3) wohl kein Konsens zu erzielen sei.
PM Major stimmt dem zu - hierzu brauche man die volle Unterstützung seitens der USA und der VN, dies sei aus bekannten Gründen nicht möglich.
Der Bundeskanzler fährt fort, (1) sei die schlechteste Option, daher bleibe letztlich wohl nur (2).
PM Major fährt fort und betont, Frankreich wolle (3) - oder gehe es nur um einen Vorwand für (1)? Mache F nicht in Wahrheit nur kriegerische Sprüche? F habe zudem einiges gesagt, was in NL und GB Verstimmung ausgelöst habe. Andererseits seien die TV-Bilder grauenhaft.
Der Bundeskanzler stimmt letzterer Aussage zu. In D gebe es bereits Stimmen, die davor warnten, daß sich die Zahl der Flüchtlinge nach D verdoppeln werde.
PM Major ergänzt, über die aktuellen Probleme hinaus gehe er davon aus, daß Präsident Tudjman das VN-Mandat in Kroatien wohl nicht verlängern werde.
Der Bundeskanzler wirft ein, er glaube nicht, daß Tudjman sich schon endgültig entschieden habe - man müsse deutlich auf ihn einwirken.
PM Major stimmt dem zu. Er wisse noch nicht, welche Entscheidung seine Regierung bis Freitag treffen werde. Erschwerend komme hinzu, daß US-Senat diese Woche wohl Entschließung zur Aufhebung des Waffenembargos verabschieden werde.
Der Bundeskanzler und PM Major verabredeten erneutes Telefonat für Freitag, 21. Juli zwischen 10.00 und 12.00 Uhr (9.00 - 11.00 Uhr britische Zeit).
(Bitterlich)
[1] BArch, B 136/59748, 211-213.
J. Bitterlich Bonn, 18 July 1995
M e m o r a n d u m
Subject: Situation in former Yugoslavia, here: Chancellor's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 17 July 1995[1]
The main points from the 10-minute telephone conversation are summarized below:
Prime Minister Major says that the situation had worsened, France had overreacted, Srebrenica was gone, the same would apply to Zepa very soon. His assumption was that the Serbs would then by trying to take Gorazde. 200 British soldiers were deployed there. Sarajevo was the crucial point for the future. We were faced with two questions:
- Where should the West put down the red line? In Gorazde or Sarajevo?
- To what extent are we prepared to go away from our current peace keeping operations in order to choose one of the conflict parties?
His hope was that the conference on Friday would bring more clarity or at least facilitate a process leading to some results. A chance in our posture would have bold consequences. If one wanted to protect Gorazde, one had to deploy quite a lot of additional troops there. This meant that one would be at war with Serbia including all the potential consequences in other places such as Sarajevo in particular. If one wanted to defend Gorazde, the question was how one would transport these troops. This could be via airdrop entailing clear risks, but without heavy weapons which would additionally increase the risk for the defenders. One would only be able to transport heavy weapons by fighting the Serbs.
With regards to Sarajevo, it was possible to clear a route across the Igman Mountain, that means to have a battle in order to establish this route. But this was just a route for the summer. If one protected Sarajevo through force, there was a danger of hostage takings in other places.
One had three options:
(1) The withdrawal of UNPROFOR
(2) The continuation of UNPROFOR ("to find a suitable way to continue UNPROFOR, even if unsatisfactory")
(3) The transition from peace keeping to peace enforcing with the consequence of war against the Bosnian Serbs.
The Chancellor expresses his thanks for these thoughts pointing out that there was perhaps no chance to reach consensus on (3).
Prime Minister Major agrees - one would need support from the U.S. and the U.N. This was impossible for well-known reasons.
The Chancellor says that (1) would be the worst option. Thus, the only feasible option would be (2).
Prime Minister Major note that France wanted (3) - or was this just a pretext for (1)? Was France actually just engaged in martial rhetoric? Some French statement had caused irritation in the Netherlands and Great Britain. On the other hand, the television images were cruel.
The Chancellor confirms the latter statement. Some voices in Germany were already warning that the number of refugees would double in Germany.
Prime Minister Major adds that beyond the current problems, his assumption was that President Tudjman would presumably not extend the UN mandate in Croatia.
The Chancellor inserts he did not think that Tudjman had already taken a final decision. One had to exercise one’s influence.
Prime Minister agrees. He could not anticipate the kind of decision that his government would take until Friday. Another burdensome issue was that the U.S. Senate would perhaps adopt a decision in favor lifting the arms embargo later this week.
The Chancellor and Prime Minister Major agree to call each other again on Friday, 21 July between 10.00 and 12.00 hours (9.00 - 11.00 hours British time).
(Bitterlich)
[1] BArch, B 136/59748, 211-213.
Kohl and Major discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia and the need to draw a red line to stop Serbian attacks in the Bosnian war. Both emphasize a potential change in NATO's posture moving from a a peace keeping operation toward a peace enforcing position entailing the possibility of full-fledged war against the Bosnian Serbs.
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