Uruguay

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 Nov 1989 describes the latest developments in Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, East Germany, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, South Africa, El Salvador, Uruguay, India, and NATO-Warsaw Pact.

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

Summary of main points discussed during Handal’s meetings with Alexander Lilov and Dimitar Stanishev regarding the political atmosphere in El Salvador and the revolutionary struggles in Latin America as a whole. Key topics include: the military and political operations of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL), the Summit of Central American Communist parties and revolutionary organizations held in Havana, and the problems encountered by the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

The CIA anticipates diplomatic victories for the PRC in Latin America as more countries will switch recognition away from Taiwan.

This version of the report was declassified on June 30, 2011. The CIA had earlier declassified a copy of the same report on October 5, 2010. Each version has different sections that were withheld from public release. Both versions of the report should be consulted by readers.