Kohl and Yeltsin talk about the convocation of regular German-Russian summits including their relevant ministers. They review Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on NATO enlargmement in March 1997 when Yeltsin gave his consent to the conclusion of a NATO-Russia partnership treaty based on the condition that NATO would not deploy nuclear armaments and permanent conventional forces in its new member states. Kohl points to the long-term perspective and the importance of concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Kohl and Yeltsin discucss the parallelism between NATO enlargement and Russia's engagement and the timing of NATO enlargement in particular. Yeltsin expresses his disappointment about the lack of progress in the U.S.-Russian talks on the issue complaining that the "the West was about to relapse into the thinking of military blocs prior to 1990. This was not acceptable," Yeltsin says. Moreover, Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russian sales of nuclear power plants for Iran.

Tabatabai conveyed his government's regret over the assassination attempt on the German Merck administrative director Leib in Tehran that was organized an anti-government, anti-foreigner terrorist gang. The new revolutionary group and it's new laws and demands are described. Tabatabai continues to say that all negative rumors about the new regime, such as persecution against women and minority religions, is Zionist propaganda. The revolution has greatly damaged business. The fate of the Kurds are discussed.

Documents summarizes a meeting between Haunschild and Etemad on an upcoming visit to Tehran. It also includes information on talks held in March 1978 with Ahmad Sotoodehnia of the Atomic Energy Organization of lran.

Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss Germany's role in the stabiliza5ion of the CIS countries and the Balkans. Rafsanjani expresses Iran's desire for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in a "good atmosphere" without pressure pledging that Iran was not planning any military use.