Kuydryavtsev confirms the Cuban request for a delivery of military equipment from the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro and Dorticos then discuss the details of failed invasion of Cuba and its effects in Cuba and the US. Castro suggests that the UN should guarantee that the US will stop interfering with and supporting counterrevolutionaries in Cuba.

Kudryavtsev delivers the text of Khrushchev's reply to Kennedy's April 18 message, and Dorticos and Fidel Castro praise the text of the message and Soviet support for Cuba. Kudryavstev infroms Castro of the granting of the Cuban governments request for various military equipment, including aircraft and specialists, from the Soviet Union.

The Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo report includes three main documents: a protocol and resolution with notes, a top secret information note, and a top secret protocol from 30 July 1970. The first section includes the Politburo's approval of the delegation's negotiations with Cuba, proposals to restructure economic partnership, and the Bulgarian delegation's statements on miscommunication between Cuba and Bulgaria. The second section, top secret information note, summarizes important exchanges during the Bulgarian visit to Cuba (e.g. Zhivkov's discussion on the importance of economic cooperation (COMECON) to the development of socialism). The third section, the top secret protocol, includes portions of a conversation between Bulgarian delegation and Cuban Politburo members. Castro summarizes ideas exchanged during the state visit.

Rapacki reports on a meeting with the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas], including: Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, [President Osvaldo] Dorticos [Torrado], Blas Roca, [and Emilio] Aragones [Navarro]. They discussed general issues of coordinating sugar trade, agricultural policy, policies toward the church, diplomatic visits, and the most current topic of the Escalante affair.

A letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation he had with Anastas Mikoyan. The two discussed mostly the USSR's position on Cuba, to which Mikoyan expressed the USSR's support of Cuba (that it would retaliate if Cuba were attacked), but that peaceful coexistence was still the Soviet's plan to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

Mikoyan, Castro and the Cuban leadership firther discuss the Soviet Union’s lack of regard for the Cubans during the missile crisis and the nature of UN inspections.