Ulbricht informs Brezhnev about his visit to the UAR following an invitation from Nasser. He also says that he wants to get in contact with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to establish a common line to present to the UAR. Ulbricht also announces a visit to the SAR and Iraq.

During the visit, the Soviet representative assured the UAR of continuing Soviet support. The UAR accepted Israel's right to exist. According to the GDR embassy in Cairo, Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union marks the beginning of increased UAR diplomatic activity in the region.

Minutes of a meeting between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and top Yugoslav officials about the crisis in the Middle East. Yugoslav Vice President Koca Popovic recounts his meeting with UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in which Nasser told of his actions leading up to and immediately following the Israeli attack. The leaders then discuss the actions of Algerian leaders and brainstorm how best to react, especially how to work with India to develop a common stance for the non-aligned movement.

Minutes of conversation between Aid to the Yugoslav State Secretary Milorad Pesic and Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia Ivan A. Benediktov regarding Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezic's visit to India to discuss the Middle East crisis. The two leaders also discuss the opening of a direct communications line between Belgrade and Moscow.

The conversation is focused on the future development of GDR-Egyptian relations. Ulbricht talks about the agitation that his visit to Egypt caused in West Germany. He also asks Nasser if official diplomatic recognition of the GDR would be possible. Nasser asks for economic support for other newly independent African states. Nasser and Ulbricht also consider general questions of agriculture and the transition to a socialist economy.

The conversation is about the joint statement on issues of economic and cultural cooperation that will be signed by Ulbricht and Nasser. They talk about the opening of an Egyptian consulate general in Berlin and consider questions of agriculture.

Minutes of conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser with occasional input from advisors. Nasser describes the situation in the Middle East, including Egypt's relations with the United States and fighting along the Suez Canal. The two leaders also discuss UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring's recent activities. Tito closes with a recount of his visit to Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and Moscow and an update of the Yugoslav economy.

Arif and Boumedienne talked to Brezhnev and Kossygin about the Six-Day War and discussed with them the possibilities for the Arab countries. The first possibility is to negotiate with the US and Israel and the second, to continue fighting, regardless of the cost. The Algerian representatives favored the second option, suggesting that otherwise an overthrow of the progressive Arab governments would be likely. Brezhnev and Kossygin argued, however, that a political solution would be more appropriate and that the main goal at the present time should be to strengthen the armies of Syria, Jordan and the UAR, and to support these countries in every respect.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

The economic relations between the GDR and the Republic of Egypt are presented, starting with the trade agreement signed on May 7, 1953, and the exchange of consular representation. Political relations between the countries were hindered, according to the report, by pressure from the FRG on Egypt and the question of whether recognizing the GDR meant creating a deeper split between the FRG and the GDR. The report also mentions problems in meeting the export and import plans set forth in the trade agreement, including unpunctuality on the side of the GDR’s trade missions. The report states that Nasser enjoys great popularity in his country as a result of his position towards the West, social politics within the country, cooperation with other Arab countries and improvements in the industrial sector. This is followed by a detailed description of Egypt’s political situation and a proposition to extend political and economic cooperation while trying to reduce the influence of the West. Finally, the report recommends continued rejection of Israel's demands for compensation.