Kohl and Mubarak discuss the overall situation in the Midle East after the Gulf War. Mubarak shares his insights examining the positions and competing interests of Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

A summary of meetings held between Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang with Japanese counterparts concerning the United States, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, Libya, Chinese politics, and other subjects.

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for 7 January 1989 covers developments in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Panama, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and Armenia. Certain portions of the document are redacted due to b(1) and b(3) exemptions.

Brief note about the current position of Italy vis-a-vis Libya. Although state-supported terrorism in Libya should be fought, it is important to avoid escalating the antagonistic sentiments and pushing Libya to align with the USSR.

The two ambassadors discuss relations between East and West Germany, as well as Somalia President Siad Barre's trip to visit Arab states.

For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

Transcript of a meeting between President Saddam Hussein amd Iraqi officials, taking place sometime between 4-20 November 1979. Saddam discusses relations with Europe, Russia, China, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Iraqi officials criticize Libya and Syria for their support to Iran. Another official criticizes the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat for his attitudes in making peace agreement with Israel. Saddam accuses the Americans of playing a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran.

Gaddafi describes Libya’s geopolitical position and requests arms, which Honecker agrees to provide. Gaddafi states that he financially supported the Iranian Revolution and intends to support movements in Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique as well. At Honecker’s suggestion, Gaddafi is willing to sign a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” between their two countries.

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.