Mitterrand gives a report on his recent meeting with Yeltsin emphasizing his support for the idea to have a multilateral Western summit meeting on financial aid for Russia prior to the 1993 Tokyo World Economic Summit as a way to show more support for Yeltsin. Kohl and Mitterrand discuss British and Japanese objections to this idea.

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the subsequent actions of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada.

Kohl an Delors look into potential problems on the road with regards to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. They discuss GATT, internal EC reforms and the perspectives of Britain's EC Council Presidency.

Kohl and Bush discuss the latter forthcoming visit to Moscow, the situation after the coup, as well as Western financial assistance for the Soviet Union and Baltic independence.

Kohl and Mulroney look back into Canada's role as a supporter of German unification. Mulroney highlights the relevance of his personal diplomacy in this endeavor. In addition, they discuss financial aid for the Soviet Union and preparations for the London World Economic Summit.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.

This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.