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Documents

January 31, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 16008 from Beijing, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

Mao asks Stalin advice and instructions concerning issues raised during negotiations, particularly the establishment of a monitoring organ comprised of officials from neutral countries.

September 29, 1950

Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin

Shtykov gives an insider’s report of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong, in which they discussed the current desperate state of the KPA, possible advancement of the US forces over the 38th parallel and the extent of the enemy’s knowledge of Soviet Union deliveries to North Korea. Kim asks for advice concerning the appeal for military aid that the Political Council of the Worker’s Party of Korea plans to send to Stalin. Shytkov comments on the nervousness and desperation of the Korean officials.

September 26, 1950

Ciphered Telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Feng Xi (Stalin)

Telegram from Zakharov to Stalin detailing the dire situation for the North Koreans following the Incheon landing.

September 30, 1950

Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin)

Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin reporting the dire circumstances into which the North Koreans had fallen in the wake of the Incheon landings. Mentioned is a correspondence between the North Koreans and Mao which hinted at possible Chinese aid.

September 29, 1950

Ciphered Telegram from DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist Leader Pak Heon-yeong to Stalin (via Shtykov)

Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel.

September 30, 1950

Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.

Pagination