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November 16, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 9 p.m., Friday

A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

November 19, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Belgrade, 12:30 p.m., Monday

A brief analysis of Chinese-Cuban relations during the crisis and Fidel Castro's diplomatic skills in his relations with both the United States and Soviet Union.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto analyzes Fidel Castro's decision to accept the “unilateral inspection,” when, beforehand, he always rejected inspection of this character.

November 14, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

November 10, 1962

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

November 12, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

November 7, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

November 5, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:45 p.m., Monday

Pinto describes two recent speeches, one by Kennedy the other by Castro, and appears to give more credit and praise to the speech by Castro. He also discusses the Cuban crisis situation in general.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m., Thursday

Campos discusses diplomatic gestures between Brazil, the United States and Cuba during the Cuban crisis and some misunderstandings that may have emerged during that time.

Pagination