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Documents

July 28, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.247, July 28, 1967

Romanian and Vietnamese diplomats discuss the purges in the Korean Workers' Party and North Korea's reunification policy.

September 29, 1954

Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Activity of the Embassy, September 29, 1954, written by comrade Victor Florescu, Second Secretary of the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

A report from the Romanian Embassy in North Korea to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs details the current states of affairs in North Korea in autumn 1954, mostly discussing the question of Korean unification, as well as prisoner exchange, North Korean economic conditions, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea's relations with China and Japan.

September 1, 1976

Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 058.014

The Embassy of Romania in Moscow assesses the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 25, 1976

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 084.527

The Embassy of Romania in Washington, D.C., assesses the United States response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 25, 1976

Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 066.252

The Embassy of Romania in Beijing assess the Chinese response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 20, 1976

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.387

The Romanian Mission to the United Nations in New York reports on developments related to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident at the UN.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.