The memoir of Trần Quang Cơ (1927-2015), former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), brings to light the intense diplomacy among great powers and regional players over the continued conflicts in Indochina after the unification of Vietnam as well as the bitter disagreements within the Vietnamese leadership over the country’s political priorities during the period of 1975-1993.

Cơ put together his memories and thoughts on “many sensitive developments” in Vietnamese foreign relations that he believed had been “intentionally or unintentionally” forgotten (rơi rụng) in the state-endorsed history “to ‘smooth over’ (tròn trĩnh) the historical record.”  Completed in Vietnamese in 2001 (updated in 2003) and informally circulated on the internet, Merle Pribbenow’s English-translation makes this valuable historical source available to wider audiences.

Australian Prime Minister Whitlam offers Zhou Enlai an overview of his country's foreign policy interests. Analyzing the international relations among key nations in East and Southeast Asia.

Memorandum of a conversation with Yuri Andropov. He and Boleslaw Jaszczuk discuss Chinese influence military and economic influence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam's opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally he notes the poor communications technology in place in Southeast Asia.

A note on a conversation between Mao Zedong and Le Duan. Zedong confronts Le Duan with instances where he has spoken out against China. Le Duan states that Vietnam does not support the Cultural Revolution, but will do nothing to oppose it. He answers other questions about economic policy and Soviet revisionism.

Information on a Czechoslovak delegation to the DRV. The Czechoslovak delegation assess the Vietnamese situation and determine that the Vietnamese successes are overestimated while American strength and fighting potential are underestimated. The Czechoslovak and Vietnamese groups disagree on China, with the Czechoslovak delegation saying the Vietnamese are simply unable to take a stance against China because it would jeopardize the aid they are receiving.

A record of a North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow, which affirmed their belief that they would be able to defeat the Americans. They raise a request for additional supplies in 1967, and it is noted that China has continued to refuse to unite with the other socialist countries, which has complicated matters.

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov reported that Vietnamese officers lately seem defensive and not trusting, while emphasizing their autonomy. Also states that Ho Chi Minh was made to promise not to talk with the US or call for volunteers from socialist countries without first consulting the Chinese.

Telegram from the GDR ambassador to China, Bierbach, assesses the Chinese position in the Vietnam conflict. He states that China aims to exacerbate the conflict for it's own gain; by pushing theDRV to action in the South, it focuses its efforts in the North, with minimal risk of conflict with US troops. Specifically, Bierbach believes China is attempting to instigate a conflict between the US and the USSR.