The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

A memorandum on the Cuban Missile Crisis covering perspectives from the three major actors: U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba.

A telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington relaying a message from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow regarding their interpretations of the Soviet Union's position on the events related to the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Cuban relations. The ambassador feels that the Soviets fear war more than the North-Americans; and he says that at no point does the Soviet government specifically refute the NorthAmerican affirmation that it is sending an amount of offensive armament with Cuba, limiting itself to reiterating that the Cuban-Soviet accord of 3 September for defensive military help to Cuba continues in force.

Suggestion for a decision to internationalize the Cuban crisis would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to "save face", diminishing the dangerous possibility of direct confrontation.