This memorandum from KGB Chairman Andropov to the CPSU Politburo follows up on the initial report from Andropov, Shchelokov, and Malyarov. The document highlights the “malevolent views” of the group that held an unauthorized demonstration in Red Square on 25 August 1968, singling out Pavel Litvinov, Larisa Bogoraz, Viktor Fainberg, and Vadim Delaunay for particular opprobrium. Andropov stresses that the KGB will intensify its crackdown on opposition figures who try to “spread defamatory information about Soviet reality.”

This memorandum, signed by Yurii Andropov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB); Nikolai Shchelokov, the Minister of Public Order (whose ministry was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late November 1968); and Mikhail Molyarov, the Procurator of the USSR, was sent to the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) eleven days after the demonstration in Red Square against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The document lays out the basic facts of the case as viewed by the KGB and the CPSU. The document mentions the names of the eight activists who were in Red Square as well as two who helped with planning but were not actually in Red Square, Inna Korkhova and Maiya Rusakovskaya. Natal’ya Gorbanevskaya, one of the eight, was detained but released because she had recently given birth. However, a year later she was arrested in connection with her involvement and sentenced to a harsh term in a psychiatric prison.

KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov presents a secret, 33-page report to the CPSU Central Committee about the mood of Soviet college students. The report had been completed sometime before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and had been circulating within the KGB. It is not clear precisely who drafted the report, but Andropov’s cover memorandum and the report itself indicate that the author was a college student in Odessa who had recently finished his degree.

The parties agree to work together in protecting their soldiers from ideological diversion by anti-socialist agents and to continue exchanging information gathered by military counter-intelligence.

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

There is a mention of the several different secretaries of different communist countries—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Korea. The need to improve economic situations and living standards in all countries is addressed, including the rebuilding of areas destroyed in the Korean war.

The Czechoslovak and Soviet security branches agreed to cooperate in the acquisition of documents and the sharing of information on hostile persons. The two parties committed to favorable relations within international organizations and joint counter-intelligence measures, articulating a focus on improving intelligence and counter-intelligence on the U.S. and its allies and China. Both parties vow to assist each other in illegal intelligence work and in the counter-intelligence monitoring of persons working for embassies, international firms or otherwise engaged in economic relations. The Czechoslovaks and Soviets agree to coordinate actions before providing assistance to security programs in developing countries, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Vietnamese Socialist Republic.

This agreement elaborates ways to increase cooperation between the KGB and Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, including information sharing on the detection of hostile plots against either state, restraint of subversive activities, protection of governmental agents, oversight of border troops and preparation of cadres. Both parties agreed to provide recreational and bathing facilities for security staff and their family members.

Delegates from the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet KGB agreed to inform each other on the work of their state security forces, implement steps to frustrate hostile acts in both countries and work mutually on questions of intelligence and counter-intelligence. The KGB agrees to provide aid to the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior in preparing cadres and receive Czechoslovak workers for study in its established schools.