Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.

The telegram to Molochkov at the USSR Mission in Switzerland reaffirms the Soviet position on German reunification and the status of East German participation in international organizations.

The correspondence from Molochkov at the USSR Mission in Switzerland to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov addresses the growing concern of the representation of East and West Germany as two independent states in international organizations.

Memorandum on Soviet policy regarding German unification including meetings with the United States, England, and France on an All-German Conference and need for future discussion. Also addressed is Soviet relations with East Germany in the forms of military assistance and economic aid for reparations.

The conversation is concerning the "German question" in terms of the conditions and aftermath of the surrender. PR China sees the negotiation on Germany as becoming an agreement that might apply similar to the question on the Japanese surrender. For this reason Jing Tai asks Molotov to allow China to take part in the negotiations on Germany. The trials of Japanese war criminals were also discussed.

Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union trade delegation discuss the DPRK's economic conditions and terms for trade between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Afterwards, Nam Il gives Puzanov an overview of discrepancies in the North Korean and Polish delegations' draft communiques.

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

Ivan Turginov reports on the policies of the Western powers on the German Question. Special emphasis is given to the public opinion in western countries with regard to Western and Soviet policies towards occupied Germany.

Memorandum summarizing the state of discussions between the Soviet Union and the Western powers on various issues regarding Germany, including political, economic and unification issues.