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Documents

June 27, 1951

Reception of Alan G. Kirk, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Record of Gromyko's discussion with Alan G. Kirk on whether the Soviet government is willing to support a peaceful resolution to the Korean problem. Gromyko answered in the affirmative. The two discussed ways to achieve a resolution, and who should be represented at the peace talks.

September 28, 1950

Outgoing Cable No. 18249, Gromyko to Vyshinsky

Gromyko asks Vyshinsky to get Tsarapkin to inform American intermediary Lancaster that Malik has agreed to the meeting. Malik must hear out the Americans and if it seems that they're willing to work towards a peaceful resolution, tell Lancaster that any questions that the Americans had during this discussion will be answered in the next meeting.

December 7, 1950

VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.

December 7, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin Transmitting Message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

December 25, 1951

Memorandum from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Gromyko suggests to Stalin, via Razuvaev, to turn down Vyshinsky’s proposal for publishing a communiqué about the American position in the armistice talks.

November 19, 1951

Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.