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Documents

August 2, 1963

Letter, Homi Bhabhi to Jawaharlal Nehru

Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru to convey that the Chinese nuclear test will be of no military significance and Chinese possession of a few bombs will not make any difference to the military situation. In order to counter the Chinese bomb’s psychological-political impact, Dr. Bhabha argues that India needs to be in a position to produce the bomb within few months.

October 31, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in India, 'India's Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'

The Chinese Embassy in India reviews various responses to China's nuclear test among Indian leaders.

October 31, 1986

Information On the Question of Renting Soviet Atomic Submarines to India

This document considers the political consequences of carrying through with the Soviet Union's promise to provide India with an Atomic submarine for scientific purposes.

January 27, 1989

E. Shevardnadze, D. Yazov, and V. Kamentsev to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev

Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze, Minister of Defense D. Yazov, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. Kamentsev discuss Soviet military committments in the Warsaw Pact and various bilateral agreements on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev.

April 21, 1967

Research Memorandum RSB-46 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Moves in Two Directions'

Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.

May 14, 1964

Research Memorandum INR-16 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Indian Nuclear Weapons Development'

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India’s nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for “normal research reactor operations,” but it was the optimum time for using the CIR’s spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. According to INR, India had taken the “first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon,” which was to have “available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it.”

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

April 11, 1968

Note from Ambassador M.A. Husain, 'NPT and Security Assurances'

Indian objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

April 20, 1968

Telegram from P.N. Haksar, 'Instructions to India’s Representative to UN on Non-Proliferation Treaty'

Details on India's position toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

May 30, 1967

Draft Reply to Starred Question No. 341 on L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister

Haksar summarizes Shri L.K. Jha and Foreign Secretary, Shri C.S Jha's diplomatic activities and exchanges on nuclear security for non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon states.

Pagination