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December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.
November 26, 1979	International Technology Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, ITO-79-155, '22 September 1979 Event Report Draft' This Los Alamos study is another in the series of report and studies of the Vela event performed by US intelligence agencies, the national labs, and contractors.
June 1978	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978' This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.
October 21, 1964	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Reactions among the North Korean Masses to China's Nuclear Test' Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea notes North Koreans' positive responses to China's first nuclear weapons test and a downfall of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union
August 24, 1955	Report by N.M Emanuel, 'Regarding the Nature of the Fallout Path of the Hydrogen Bomb Detonated on 1 March 1954 at Bikini [Atoll]' Report by N.M. Emanuel on the U.S. Castle Bravo test in the Marshall Islands. The report surmises from fallout data that the bomb used a fission-fusion-fission design, and that the bomb contained a larger than normal amount of fissile material which induced a thermonuclear reaction.
June 30, 1955	Letter from Iu. B. Khariton to N. I. Pavlov Regarding the Testing of a Nuclear Weapon at Object 700 The letter describes geographic, safety, and technical considerations taken into account when selecting a test site for the RDS-37 hydrogen bomb. Specifically, the letter highlights that a testing field should be chosen based on the existence of population centers, the terrain, and the main wind patterns.
February 28, 1955	Report by the Measurement Lab of the USSR Academy of Science, 'On the Properties of the Atomic Bombs Detonated on the Marshal Islands in 1954' Soviet scientific intelligence report on U.S. nuclear weapons testing on the Marshall Islands in 1954. This report concludes that the Ivy Mike and Castle nuclear detonations were thermonuclear based on gamma ray spectroscopy of fission fragments collected by Soviet aircraft over the USSR and PRC.
May 27, 1974	Confidential Note from Pierre Laurent to the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laurent of the French Department of Scientific Affairs describes the first Indian nuclear test and the resulting reevaluation of French nuclear cooperation with India. New guarantees are suggested to ensure that French-supplied nuclear technology and materials could not be used in future Indian nuclear explosions.
May 23, 1974	Telegram from French Ambassador Jean-Daniel Jurgensen to the French Foreign Ministry in Paris Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, the French ambassador to India, describes the Indian response to the negative international reaction to India's first nuclear test in 1974. He reports that the “Indians are particularly pleased because France has abstained from all unfriendly judgments and they believe that France is herself well-placed to understand the Indian position in this domain.”