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October 30, 1962

Memorandum from Seymour Weiss, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, to Jeffrey Kitchen, 'Turkish IRBM Trade-Off'

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

October 26, 1962

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 587 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

July 27, 1970

Message from Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to President Nixon (Transmitted by Col. Kennedy to Kissinger) regarding Soviet military presence in UAR.

A message from Ambassador Dobrynin to President Nixon regarding the Soviet military presence in the Middle East.

June 16, 1970

Memorandum for the President, "The Middle East"

Kissinger provides a historical overview of the current state of the Middle East and the decisions the US has made, and offers a suggested proposal to negotiate peace between Israel and the Arab States while taking the Soviet Union into account.

March 13, 1970

Memorandum for the President, "The New Soviet tactic on Middle East Talks"

An analysis of the Soviet's proposal for a resumption of bilateral talks on a Middle East settlement, specifically the reasoning behind the Soviet's desire to resume conversations.

March 10, 1970

Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss the upcoming SALT talks, the situation in the Middle East, and Vietnam.

June 9, 1970

Memorandum for the President, "Next Steps in the Middle East"

A memorandum that outlines several proposed courses of action the United States could take in order to stop the fighting in the region, restart negotiations, provide Israel reassurance, and does not reflect weakness towards Moscow.

June 9, 1970

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

A recap of a meeting in which Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Dobrynin discuss proposed formulations to negotiate a peace in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union's involvement in the UAR.

February 9, 1970

Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) Meeting, February 9, 1970, "Possible Soviet Moves in Egypt"

Notes of a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group. They plan to draw up a US position for dealing with possible Soviet moves in Egypt within the next week, and review the military situation in the Middle East in subsequent meetings.

February 6, 1970

Memorandum for the President, "Further Background on the Kosygin Letter"

A memorandum in which Kissinger theorizes on the reasoning behind the Kosygin letter, specifically Brezhnev's anger over an Israeli strike on several Soviet advisors in the region and Soviet frustration over the limited options in their current position.

Pagination