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Documents

March 8, 1961

Note Assessing Italian Strategic Vulnerability

Evaluation of vulnerability to Soviet aggression due to Italy’s geographic location (the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean) and political position (mostly communist). Reporting on the decision to increase nuclear weapons as well as bolster the air force in order to protect Italy and surrounding Mediterranean countries, which becomes essential considering the Soviet Union has made open threats directed at Europe and NATO.

January 1, 1985

Letter by Ambassador in Moscow Sergio Romano to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Sergio Romano, writes to Foreign Minister Andreotti to dicuss the topic of the Soviet attitude towards the SDI, and the unsuccessful efforts by the Soviets to pursue a similar defense system. Even though SDI is no longer a hindrance to superpower dialogue, it would be a mistake to assume that the USSR has given up the battle against the overall missile defense system.

December 13, 1988

Telegram by Ambassador Vanni D'Archirafi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NATO Ministerial meeting in the light of Gorbachev's announcement to the United Nations - West Germany's assessments'

The telegram decribes West Germany's reactions on Gorbachev's December 7, 1988 address at the UN where he announces drastic changes in Soviet foreign and security policy.

November 24, 1987

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'East-West relations'

An analysis of the state of East-West relations. The document covers US-USSR relations, CSCE, euro-Soviet relations, and USSR internal developments.

December 13, 1986

Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ministerial Session of the Atlantic Council - Point II of the agenda. Speech of US Secretary of State Shultz about the prospects of post-Reykjavik scenario'

Secretary of State, George P. Schultz analyzes US position following the collapse of the US-Soviet talks in Reykjavik. He discusses credibility of nuclear deterrence, US commitment to Europe and increasing conventional forces.

December 12, 1985

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'East-West relations'

This document analyzes East-West relations following the December 1985 meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva. It discusses the new and more open foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, and underlines the important role of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy under the complex circumstances.

December 15, 1985

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Geneva negotiations - New Soviet proposals'

The document describes the propositions put forth by Soviet negotiators during the Geneva talks, and offers a preliminary analysis of the positive and the negative implications. The developments are not sufficient to expect an accord in the short term, but show a promising move away from "a dialogue of the deaf".

October 15, 1985

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Geneva negotiations - New Soviet proposals. An assessment'

A detailed evaluation of Soviet negotiation position vis-à-vis USA and Europe suggests that Moscow's willingness to agree on reductions and limitations does not meet Western needs. Gorbachev's doctrine seems to be in line with his predecessors, although increasing attention has been directed at Europe.

May 24, 1953

Sample Plan for the Draft Response to the Notes of the Three Powers

Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.

March 28, 1984

Information of Comrade A. A. Gromyko on International Questions

Gromyko analyzes the Reagan administration and the increase in international tensions as a result of US "activism." He also discusses the role of Japan as a self-identified NATO and G7 member, a cause for alarm, he concludes.

Pagination