An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

This document includes accounts of several conversations between Soviet officials and US diplomats, including Andrei Gromyko for the Soviets, and Dean Rusk and Arthur Goldberg for the Americans. The most pressing topic discussed during these meetings was figuring out mutually acceptable language to mollify Soviet demands that the NPT contain explicit prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries not just directly but through a military alliance, namely, NATO, remembering previous US attempts to nuclearize NATO through the Multilateral Force (MLF). Some attention is paid to fears not just of the Soviet Union but the US and other NATO allies as well about the FRG acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition to the focus on the semantic differences in the Soviet and American drafts of the NPT, the document emphasizes that one key area of common ground between the Soviets and Americans is the importance that an agreement be reached sooner rather than later before more countries acquire nuclear capabilities.

This correspondence between Davis Boster and Georgy Kornienko recounts Boster's impressions of where US-Soviet negotiations on the NPT stand after reading Kornienko's report of a conversation with the US chargé. Boster summarizes areas of common ground between the US and the Soviets while also expressing the hope that what he describes as semantic differences over whether to explicitly prohibit transfers of nuclear weapons to a group of countries do not impede the achievement of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Boster closes by expressing the hope and willingness to continue negotiations in New York and reach an agreement.

A note from D.E. Boster translated into Russian from the English. This correspondence references a previous conversation with the temporary Charge d'Affaires, John Gatry, about the NPT.

This note to be distributed to the Central Committee of the USSR describes a conversation between Andrei Gromyko and US Chargé d'Affaires regarding the Americans' proposed language in Article I of the NPT. Gromyko shared the concern of the Soviet government that the American draft as it stands says nothing about prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons under joint control to an alliance or group of countries, and that the Soviet government wants to close off all means through which to proliferate nuclear weapons. Gromyko raised other concerns with the American draft and requests that Gatry notifies the US government and Dean Rusk of their conversation with the hope that Soviet concerns can be addressed appropriately.

This note summarizes a conversation between Alexei Roshchin and William Foster concerning Foster's views on individual provisions of the Soviet draft of the NPT, with Foster's primary concerns pertaining to Article I. The main issue of contention between the Soviet and American drafts is whether to explicitly prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons on a group basis or within an alliance, as the Soviets desire, but to which the Americans do not want explicitly stated in the Treaty. Roshchin conveyed the readiness of the Soviets to continue discussions on Article I, to which Foster's response that he would need to coordinate with the White House on the official posture of the US government toward the new Soviet language on the issue.

This memo discusses several amendments proposed by various non-nuclear countries during the First Committee of the UNGA, and the Soviet delegation's amenability to adding amendments and clarifications to the NPT so long as the essence of the Treaty is not altered or undermined. Some of the topics of the proposed amendments include the strengthening of sharing nuclear technology and research on nuclear energy and other peaceful uses of the atom and international observation as it pertains to peaceful nuclear explosions. Attention is also paid to when further negotiations on peaceful nuclear explosions will take place, relaying the difference in Soviet and American opinions on what the optimal timing of those negotiations would be but, ultimately, the Soviet government's desire, first and foremost, to have the NPT go into effect as soon as possible.

This memo to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, includes proposed amendments and clarifications to various articles and sections of the NPT. Topics of the proposed amendments include an emphasis on the continued importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the exchange of research and technology on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The document also describes how to proceed in negotiations with the American side, as well as with several Warsaw Pact countries, and to telegraph once the requests in the memo have been delivered.

Sent to the Soviet representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, this document lists the nations to which the representative must pay the most attention at the UN meeting. The document also underlines how the Soviet representative should speak with members of the American delegation in reference to any diplomatic collaboration on the NPT.

This document references the draft model agreement of non-nuclear weapons states, instructing both the Soviet MFA and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (which supervised the Soviet nuclear industry) to conduct negotiations with the US to solidify this agreement. After negotiating with the Americans, they are instructed to make sure that the project is approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and inform socialist UN member states and the GDR about the Soviet position on the NPT.