The Soviet Union sent a delegation to the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives in Beijing. During this time, A.N. Kosygin and Mao Zedong discussed Vietnam including American military actions, Soviet assistance and support, and their socialist path. The conversation then moved towards a debate over spheres of military influence. The Soviets believed that they and the Chinese should unite to fight against American capitalism, but Mao stated that the Soviets should protect Europe and Chine should protect Asia. Other issues addressed included imperialism, Africa, the United Nations, foreign relations, and the concern over factions between communist states and internal factions within parties.

In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

These notes highlight some foreign relation issues facing Poland, China, and the Soviet Union. Current opinions and practices are mentioned, as well as previous actions.

Spychalski conveys the Ministry of National Defense's proposed supplement to the Treaty on the Status of Soviet Forces Stationed in Poland. The supplement addresses the movement of Soviet units by air and sea.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

Poland’s Foreign Minister reports that he informed the new PRC ambassador of Poland's interest in developing relations with China, adding that he believes the difficulties between China and other socialist countries to be temporary. The PRC ambassador responded by saying that "there are divergences between our countries" but that it should not prevent friendly state relations. The two also discussed Sino-Soviet relations, with the PRC ambassador stating that in that realm, there are divergences that cannot be resolved.

Comrade Kliszko presents Liu Ningyi with a letter from six socialist countries calling for a conference to discuss aid and coordination in Vietnam in response to "American imperialism." He urges China to rally against this common enemy, despite the ideological differences dividing the socialist nations. Liu responds harshly both to the proposal and to Comrade Kliszko's statement, arguing China "did not want anything to do with a revisionist clique of the Soviet Union’s leadership and its lackeys."

Soviet bloc leaders discuss current UN resolutions being devised to deal with the Middle East crisis and unmask U.S. imperialism at work. They talk about the US's desire to forces Nasser out. They also discuss internal Israeli politics, with dovish president Eshkol pitted against hawkish Defense Minister Dayan. They agree that this may be the best chance to make the Arabs realize that a political solution, not a military one, is necessary to solve the Middle East crisis. Tito pushes for a common resolution of all socialist countries, not just the USSR.

This gives a short overview of Chinese foreign policy in light of Communist and Soviet attitudes and perceptions in China. A possible Soviet response to such attitudes is suggested.