The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

A CIA estimate of the strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, with particular reference to its staying power. The declassified portion of this report includes only the report's summary and conclusions.

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

A report on Kuomintang efforts for the upcoming national election in Taiwan and the individuals surrounding Chiang Ching-kuo.

The United States' interests in its relationships with China and Taiwan would be best served if Beijing and Taipei could reach some form of accommodation or association that would permit the two parts of China to coexist peacefully. The worst outcome would be a military confrontation that forced the United States to choose whether to provide .assistance to Taiwan or to allow it to be overwhelmed by superior Chinese force. Trends over the past four years have moved fitfully toward an eventual accommodation, and they probably will continue in this direction.