Skip to content

Results:

1 - 7 of 7

Documents

December 4, 1950

Memorandum of Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

Their discussion involves the idea of a definite Soviet victory in Korea, the failure of US soldiers and President Truman, the internal politics of the US; internal politics of China, the progress of the decision about Germany among the Soviets as well as other Western powers.

December 5, 1950

VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing with message for Zhou Enlai

Memorandums from the VKP(b) CC to Vyshinsky and Roshchin regarding the Soviet and PRC stances on discussions in the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Chinese intervention in Korea.

November 9, 1950

CC Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Roshchin with Message for Zhou Enlai

Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

October 2, 1959

Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong

Khrushchev and Mao discuss current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan.

November 9, 1950

Protocol No. 78 of a Meeting of the Special Committee Under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Draft telegram to Roshchin on Chinese participation in the UN Security Council.

September 29, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

International relations between the USSR, China, USA, and England; a proposal to have discussions among the different nations in regards to the solution for post-WWII Germany; mention of an attempt to lessen tension.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.