Representatives from Romania and the Soviet Union discuss the current industrial and economic situation, as well as foreign relations with China.

Khrushchev, Kosygin, and Romanian representative Bodnăraş discuss the history of Soviet-Romanian relationships, Soviet espionage in Romania, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Ceauşescu was sent in the USSR by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to establish a meeting between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nikita Khrushchev. During the meeting, Nikita Khrushchev said to Nicolae Ceauşescu: “By sending missiles to Cuba, we ourselves put our head in a bind. I know comrade Gheorghiu-Dej was upset that I had not informed about sending missiles to Cuba. And he has been rightly upset."

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Gheorghiu Dej, informing the Romanian leadership of the decision taken by the Soviet leadership to withdraw the Soviet Red Army troops from the territory of Romania. Military and security services advisors will however remain in place until 1963.

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.