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Documents

February 7, 1955

Memorandum for Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

The Department of State shares with the CIA several documents, including a record of conversation between Anthony Eden and a Soviet diplomat in London on February 2, 1955; a record of conversation between Ambassador Hayter and Molotov on February 4; a translation of Molotov's statement made to Hayter; and comments made by Humphrey Trevelyan. 

November 14, 1984

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Taiwan: Abandoning Low Key Diplomacy'

The Office of East Asian Analysis at the CIA concludes that Taiwan is moving away from its "lowkey diplomacy" and reverting to a tougher and more aggressive stance in defending its international standing.

April 10, 1984

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Deng Xiaoping's Discussion of Taiwan with the President [Ronald Reagan]'

A CIA memo anticipating what Deng Xiaoping might say about Taiwan when meeting with US President Reagan in late April 1984. 

June 1981

Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, 'China's Views of Relations with the New US Administration: An Intelligence Assessment'

A CIA assessment of Chinese views of the United States and areas of both alignment and divergence with US policy and interests.

September 14, 1961

Reception by N.S. Khrushchev of Japanese Ambassador H. Yamada, September 14, 1961

The two parties discuss solutions for improving Soviet-Japanese trade relations. Khrushchev expresses concern about Japan's military ties with the US, given that there are US army bases in Japan. Yamada raises the concern of logistical difficulties faced by Japanese businesspeople visiting the USSR. The two parties also discuss Soviet-Japanese treaties and geopolitical relations. 

August 29, 1960

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Prominent Political Figure of Japan M. Suzuki on August 29, 1960

Khrushchev and Suzuki discuss Japan's neutrality, the American intelligence plane incident, and the failure of the Paris summit. 

May 10, 1960

Record of Conversation: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev with the Minister of Farming and Forestry of Japan T. Fukuda and Chairman of the Association of Fisheries T. Takasaki May 10, 1960

The leaders discuss possibilities to improve the Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese delegation inquires about the permission for Japanese fishermen to use the Soviet fishing grounds and a chance to establish aerial communication between Japan and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev affirms the Soviet-Japanese friendship and expresses willingness to conduct trade. 

January 24, 1960

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s Note on a Memorandum to Japan

Khrushchev suggests to not frame America as an aggressor and offers to focus on the issue of Japanese national independence. He announces that Japan can only return to the Japanese with the departure of foreign troops

August 5, 1957

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Vice President of the “Japan-USSR” Friendship Society Kazami Akira

Kazami and Khrushchev discuss the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Japanese independence. Kazami inquires about the possible participation of Japanese specialist in the industrial development of Siberia. He also asks about the potential transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan. 

August 2, 1963

Antonín Gregor, 'Explanatory Memorandum [on the Limited Test Ban Treaty]'

A report produced by the Czechoslovak foreign ministry in August 1963 recommending the ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  One of the key goals of early Czechoslovak engagement in the ENDC was to reject a nuclear test ban, based on their rejection of any verification measures. However, once the Soviets agreed to the LTBT with the US and the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak foreign ministry praised the agreement and attacked those (such as China) who resisted the measure. One interesting aspect of the treaty was the proposed role of depositary powers. The document indicates that the Soviets were interested in being a depositary power to the LTBT in order to prevent ratification by governments not recognized by the USSR, most notably West Germany and the Republic of China. The issue of depositary powers reappeared later on, in the NPT as well.

Pagination