Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 22 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Poland, EC, USSR, Germany, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Eastern Europe, Japan, US and Liberia.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 19 December 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Germany, Poland, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, France and Africa.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 7 July 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Albania, Poland, Liberia, South Africa, Latin America, Yugoslavia and France.

The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."

General de Gaulle discusses France's positions on the German question in terms of Germany's borders, disarmament, and alliances. De Gaulle insists that Germany's Western border should not extend past the Rhine and that the country should be disarmed militarily, economically, and morally. He argues that international alliances between the USSR and France should be multilayered, and should include some involvement United States. Stalin argues for the benefit of a tripartite pact between the USSR, France, and England. Stalin then describes a pact between the USSR and France to bolster Poland.

General de Gaulle and Marshal Stalin discuss the historical affinity between France and Poland, France's aim to support a Poland that can stand up to Germany in the future, France's support of the Curzon line as well as it insistence that Poland should remain an independent state. Stalin and de Gaulle discuss the concept of a "western bloc" of European nations, de Gaulle assures Stalin he has no aims to create such an alliance. De Gaulle reaffirms France's support for Poland as well as the need for friendship between France, Poland, and the USSR. They discuss the creation of a new league of nations.

The text of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin.

C.D. Jackson, now assistant to President Eisenhower, urges CIA director Allen Dulles to make contingency plans to exploit future unrest in the Communist world during a perceived “Winter of Discontent.”

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.