Kohl and Mitterrand comment on the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and the idea of convening an international conference on the region.

The Foreign Ministry saying a newspaper is reporting that Romania is stopping Jewish emigration to Israel.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 4 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Iran, El Salvador, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Thailand, Somalia, Bolivia, Romania, the United States, and Israel.

Since the Six-Day War, Romania has been the only communist state in diplomatic relations with Israel.

Describes the conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Abbas Massoudi, Vice-President of the Majlis, regarding the current situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conclusion was that Egypt is ready to sign a treaty, but Israel has not welcomed any recent proposals. Both agreed that it is important for international community to help find solution to conflict.

Description of conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi regarding efforts to find a solution to the conflict between Israel and Egypt involving border disputes and the Suez Canal.

Nicolae Ceaușescu received Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Soltan Hossein Vakili Sanandaji, and they discussed developments in the Near East, specifically the ongoing conflict between Israel and Arab states. Ceaușescu suggested to the Ambassador that Iran should use its influence in the area to encourage other Arab states to seek a peaceful and realistic resolution to the conflict.

In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.

Request from the Moldavian Communist Party to send KGB officers to Moldavia in light of the “intensification of subversive activities directed against the republic by the special services and ideological centers of the Western countries,” of Israel, and of Romania. Travelers coming from Romania were deemed particularly dangerous because of their efforts “to inculcate our citizens with a nationalist spirit.” A “considerable part of them” smuggled in “materials and literature that are dangerous from the political perspective” while others “propagated the separate course of the Romanian leadership, the idea of breaking off the former Bessarabia from the USSR and uniting it with Romania.”

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.