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September 12, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Polish President Kwasniewski on Thursday, 12 September 1996, 9.30 hours

Kohl and Kwasniewski exchange thoughts on the state of Yeltsin's health. They agree that NATO must not pursue further steps in the enlargement process during the period of Yeltsin's illness after his  coronary bypass surgery. Finally, Kohl and Kwasniewski look into the timetable for NATO enlargement and the decision about its new members at the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid.

January 10, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of the Polish Republic, Mister Alexander Kwasniewski on 9 January 1996 at the Chancellor’s Office

Kohl refers to the Franco-German relationship as a role model for Germany’s relationship with Poland. Kwasniewski looks into Poland's domestic reform agenda stressing the importance of further expanding Poland's ties with NATO and the EC.

September 9, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993

Kohl and Clinton discuss plans for NATO enlargement and the need to find a modus vivendi for an intermediate period as a way to balance Russia's engagement and the security interests of the Central and East European countries. Kohl has doubts over the feasibility of NATO enlargement but is willing to search for an intermediary solution.

May 4, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in Bonn, 30 April 1992, 11:45 – 12:10 Hours

Kohl and Miyazawa talk about financial aid for Russia and preparations for the 1992 World Economic Summit as well as Kohl's request for additional Japanese economic support for Russia. In contrast, Miyazawa highlights the importance of the unresolved territorial question over the Kuriles.

June 2007

Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.