Includes memoranda on "China's Independent Foreign Policy in Perspective," "The Foreign Policy Positions of China's Senior Leaders," "Deng-Zhao with Brzezinski--An Assessment," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "China and a Korean Dialogue," "Sino-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," "China and Japan: Building for the Long Haul," "China's Taiwan Policy," "China-Southeast Asia," "China: Leadership and Succession," "China: Economic Reforms," "US-China Economic Relations," "China: Expanding Market for US Energy Firms," "China: Nuclear Power Prospects," and "China: Changes in Military Industrial Development Policy-Implications for the United States."

This “Limited Distribution” report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in US-Japan security relations or in Tokyo’s general approach to nuclear weapons.

Gromyko informs Liu Xiao of the Soviet position and strategy in its negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom for halting nuclear tests.

Speaking at the Politburo, Zhou Enlai explains how nuclear weapons capabilities have won China newfound admiration in the non-aligned world and instilled fear in the other nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Soviet Union.

Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.

Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.

The Soviet Central Committee informs their Chinese counterparts that, in light of the arms reduction talks taking place in Geneva, Soviet nuclear assistance must cease. The Chinese had requested a sample atomic bomb and technical data, but the Soviet feared that doing so would imperil the efforts of the socialist countries in Geneva.

Mao addresses the Central Military Commission to report on China's steel production, which he believes will surpass the Soviet Union's capability in seven years and the United States' in ten. He also makes it known that China will build "atom bombs, hydrogen bombs and inter-continental missiles," and believes this can be done in as few as ten years.

Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.

Zhou Enlai addresses the State Council citing a need for China to "master atomic energy." The Chinese program is far behind in this area, but plans to catch up with the help of Soviet technical assistance.