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Documents

January 1, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in India, 'Overview of India’s Foreign Relations in 1961'

The Chinese Embassy in India reported on Indian foreign relations for the year 1961. In the report, the following issues are mentioned: Indian dependence on the United States, capitalism, opposition to China and communism, imperialism, and Indian-Pakisti relations.

April 3, 1978

TELEGRAM 066.609 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Gang Ryang-uk and Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai meet but fail to reach a consensus on Korean unification and the Kashmir issue.

December 15, 1995

Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

December 15, 1995

Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

October 22, 1956

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'The Pakistani Foreign Minister’s Speech'

Chinese report on a speech by the Pakistani Foreign Minister concerning bringing the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council, Pakistan's relations with Muslim countries, the Southeast Asian Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, the possibility of Pakistan joining the Suez Canal Users' Association and its willingness to accept aid from any country.

January 4, 1956

Abstract of Conversation between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Ambassador to China Sultanuddin Ahmad

Zhou Enlai and Sultanuddin Ahmed discussed the Kashmir issue and the consequences of the Soviet stance. China also expressed its disapproval with Pakistani involvement in the Manila Treaty, the Baghdad Pact and Islamabad's military agreement with the US.

November 24, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between Chinese Director of First Department of Asian Affairs Zhang Wenjin and Ambassador of Pakistan Raza

Ambassador Raza expressed his support for China in the Sino-Indian border conflict, accused India of being two-faced, and talked about how people had misunderstood Pakistan in favor of India in the past.

October 20, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Minutes of the Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador Ding Guoyu and Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Secretary on the Sino-Indian Border Clash'

The two discussed Pakistan's view toward the Sino-Indian conflict. Pakistan sympathized with China and thought that India "deserved to be taught a lesson". Islamabad regarded Nehru as a liar who was ostensibly neutral, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist but in fact signed secret treaties with the US. Both Chinese and Pakistani representatives agreed to strive to resolve peacefully the border issue between Beijing and Islamabad.

February 17, 1984

Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

Pagination