Alfonso Garcia Robles used his address to describe the progress in the negotiations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For him, this treaty included the most ambitious definition of nuclear weapons compared to existing nuclear governance texts. Another innovation was the reliance on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguard system to monitor compliance. Garcia Robles also explained that Latin American delegations were almost in consensus about the Treaty of Tlatelolco text except for a couple of issues. Countries did not agree on defining the territory where the treaty would apply and when it would enter into force. The Ambassador also took this opportunity to explain the Latin American efforts to obtain negative security assurances from China. Moreover, he reminded delegates that the success of the NPT would depend on balancing obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. Mexican representatives argued that it was necessary to include more ambitious disarmament goals in the draft of the NPT. However, they rejected proposals to condition the approval of the NPT on the existence of concrete steps toward disarmament

This agreement details the responsibilities of governments party to the NPT and the IAEA in accordance with the Treaty, including transparent and prompt notifications to the IAEA about any nuclear materials, facilities, and transfers of nuclear materials within a state's territory. Transparency about nuclear materials is reciprocal, with the NPT obligating the IAEA to send an inventory list to the governments every 12 months or upon request. Additionally, this document details safeguard procedures, including IAEA inspections (and the responsibility of governments to provide inspectors with the necessary visas). This document also states that the present agreement will be in force indefinitely, and a state can cease to abide by its terms if it ceases to be a participant in the NPT per Article X on the right of states to withdraw.

This document references the draft model agreement of non-nuclear weapons states, instructing both the Soviet MFA and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (which supervised the Soviet nuclear industry) to conduct negotiations with the US to solidify this agreement. After negotiating with the Americans, they are instructed to make sure that the project is approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and inform socialist UN member states and the GDR about the Soviet position on the NPT.

The Politburo confirms the instructions previously sent to their delegation at the IAEA General Conference, in regards to the IAEA's responsibilities towards nuclear testing.Decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for 3-11 October 1968
 

Chairman Kosygin sends greetings and best wishes for success to the twelfth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Directives for topics sent to the Soviet Delegation at the XII session of the IAEA General Conference. Points made include the Soviet Union's readiness to enrich Uranium.

Report and political analysis by amb. Ducci on the IAEA Conference. The paper discusses the draft resolution presented by Italy, US reaction , USSR attitude, as well as the position of other delegations.

MAE Memo on the Italian proposal to amend the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors. Considerations by ambs. Ducci and Gaja and prof. Carlo Salvetti

MAE Memo on Italian initiative for securing the revision of art. 6 of the IAEA Statute in order to allow Italy's permanent inclusion, as a civil nuclear power, in the Board of Governors.

This memorandum to Commissioner Martino from Ambassador Schaetzel accepts the Soviet Draft Article III as he believes it will permit non-nuclear Euratom countries to negotiate collectively with the IAEA and permit a satisfactory verification concept.