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April 23, 1975

Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Meeting with French on Missile Cooperation'

Description of a meeting between Sonnenfeldt and Jean-Laurens Delpech, French Minister of Armaments. Delpech was concerned about the slow response to the French requests for further nuclear assistance. Sonnenfeldt explained that they were awaiting a detailed technical analysis of the requests and limitations of US policy. Delpech also raised the issues of French use of the Nevada Test Site. Attached to the memorandum is a handwritten letter by Delpech to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

June 23, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 299, 'Cooperation with France'

Directive from President Ford expanding nuclear safety cooperation with France to include assistance with improving the safety of underground testing. This would involve only information sharing, and "no French nuclear explosive devices of any type may be accepted for test by the US."

October 9, 1975

Memorandum for the Record by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 'Conversation with Delpech'

Description of conversation between Sonnenfeldt and Jean-Laurens Delpech, French Minister of Armaments, on October 7. Delpech asked about the status of US nuclear assistance to France. He specifically asks about French requests for testing of reentry vehicle material in US nuclear tests, the importation of advanced computers, technical assistance with booster trigger design, and information on submarine vulnerabilities. Other topics included the French sale of helicopters to China and the potential sale of ECM equipment to Arab states.

July 26, 1973

Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 'Supplementary Checklist for Meeting with French Defense Minister'

When meeting with the French Defense Minister Kissinger is to stress how much the U.S. has supported France despite negative views on such assistance by European countries and by Congress, and that this president could not be more sympathetic to French needs. The NSSM 175 review of the policy towards France is attached, and it reviews previous aid given to France, complications that arouse due to restrictions on such aid, and what the French are now requesting. It extensively reviews missile assistance, nuclear safety exchanges, and other French aid issues. The second part addresses the issue in light of U.S.-European political relations, and the effect any such aid might have on such relations. It notes that future French aid might be given to hardening technologies, and to aiding in Poseidon information, and to underground nuclear testing, and it weighs the pros and cons in the eyes of the British. It concludes with an overview of how such aid could be in the interest (or not) of the U.S., but several parts of the last part of this document are blacked-out, marked for secrecy.

August 3, 1958

Fourth Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, Hall of Qinjendiang [Beijing]

Mao and Khrushchev discuss the building of American bases around the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons testing and President Eisenhower.

May 23, 1974

Telegram No. 113, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Five days after India's first nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that Indian foreign policy experts speculate that the test could lead to closer Indian-Soviet relations.

May 23, 1974

Telegram No. 118, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Five days after India's 1974 nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that the Indian government was grateful that the socialist countries had not confronted India on its nuclear explosion.

May 31, 1974

Telegram No. 120, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Discussion of the importance of internal stability and the concept of independence in guiding India's foreign policy following India's first nuclear test.

August 14, 1974

Telegram No. 84, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the U.N. in Geneva to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Hungarian mission to the UN in Geneva stating that the Indian government had provided the Soviets advance notice of their May 1974 nuclear test and that one of the purposes of the test was to reinforce then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's flagging position.

May 17, 1979

Ciphered Telegram No. 49, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on the Pakistani nuclear program

The Hungarian Embassy in Pakistan reports that according to the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan, the Pakistani government was able, in 1979, to build a nuclear explosive device within one and a half years. In the view of the Soviet ambassador, because of the perceived inevitability of a Pakistani test, the socialist bloc must consider means of stopping the Pakistani nuclear program.

Pagination