Polish and Soviet officials review the internal situation in and the foreign policy of the DPRK, including relations with both socialist and capitalist countries.

Moskovsky advised Pak Geum-cheol and Kim Chang-man to cooperate with the Soviet-led socialist bloc. Conversation with Kim Il Sung and Moskovsky imply strong relations with the Soviet Union.

Summary of Soviet foreign, economic, and military relations with Somalia. In reaction to Siad Barre's military coup, the Soviet Union plans to intensify relations with Somalia.

Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.

Cable sent from a Polish representative in Moscow to Adam Rapacki in Warsaw about a meeting with Andrei Gromyko. He believes that the United States wishes to remove itself from the situation in Vietnam and concludes that a way to end the issue is getting closer.

Polish Ambassador Ochęduszko reports on a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest, Alexander Vasilievich Basov. Basov informed him about a conversation he had with Nicolae Ceaușescu on August 25 in which Basov complained about Romanian press which criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Ceausescu continued to insist that military intervention was a mistake.

Jaszczuk and Yuri Andropov discuss Poland's relations with the CPSU CC during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."