That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

State Department Policy Planning Director George Kennan outlines, in a document for the National Security Council, the idea of a public committee, working closely with the US government, to sponsor various émigré activities.

INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources.

Before the words “nuclear nonproliferation” entered official discourse, the term “non-diffusion” (or “non-dissemination”) of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement.

Pair of cipher telegrams from Anastas Mikoyan to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He is summarizing his meetings with State Department officials regarding Soviet newspaper reports of the Kennedy assassination. He also discusses U.S. government officials' and Jackie Kennedy's deep appreciation for the Soviet government's decision to send representatives to Kennedy's funeral.

Cipher telegram to the Central Committee from Russian Ambassador Dobrynin detailing a meeting he had US ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. The telegram contains a copy of a letter Jacqueline Kennedy wrote to Nikita Khrushchev expressing her gratitude for the Krushcev's kindness throughout John's life.

Soviet communication with the United States concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship and other documents concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to the USSR released following the assassination of President Kennedy.

Telegrams from Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to The United States, to the CC CPSU on measures to be taken and report on the "slanderous fabrications" in the American press regarding Oswlad's connections with the USSR