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The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

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Western Europe

France

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

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Western Europe

Great Britain

Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

Berlin Wall

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Rush, Kenneth

1910-

Nuclear Proliferation

François Mitterrand in 1983

Mitterrand, François

1916- 1996

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Abrasimov, P.A. (Pyotr Andreievitch)

1912- 2009

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Dulles, Allen

1893- 1969

Official portrait for President George H.W. Bush, 1989.

Bush, George H.W.

1924- 2018

Photograph of Helmut Kohl, 1982.

Kohl, Helmut

1930- 2017

Mitrokhin Archive

Soviet Foreign Policy

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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October 2, 1957	Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach] Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.
September 17, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. President Bush on Monday, 16 September 1991, at the White House Kohl and Bush analyze European security and the potential creation of a European pillar in NATO as well as France's rapproachment vis-a-vis NATO via the WEU. Kohl provides an assessment of Mitterrand's personality and his diplomacy toward Germany.
February 20, 1991	The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with President Mitterrand at the Elysée on 15 February 1991 Kohl and Mitterrand examine the Soviet position in the Gulf War and the situation in the Baltics.
February 21, 1990	Assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'Question of German Unity (State of affairs, February 1990)' The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.
January 31, 1962	Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability' Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
June 4, 1957	Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences' This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret
June 11, 1976	George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
August 19, 1971	Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger Regarding the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin Rush updates National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the progress of the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin, informing him that the "bureaucrats [in the State Department] have been foiled" and an agreement has been completed and "it contains virtually everything we hoped to get under our maximum demands."
August 18, 1971	Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger on the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin US Ambassador Rush recommends to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that the negotiations take a "no more than a two week recess" in agreement with the request made by Secretary of State Rogers.
August 18, 1971	Cable from Secretary Rogers to Ambassador Rush on the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin Alarmed by the speed of the negotiations' progress, Secretary Rogers informs Ambassador Rush (and Henry Kissinger) that "an ad referendum agreement should not be reached at the present time."