A description of the political and economic situation in South and North Korea, and on the presence of the struggling democratic and reactionary forces and their influence among the people. Attached are three appendices on the combat and strength of the South Korean and the People's Army of North Korea, the amount of weapons in the People's Army, and the amount of ammunition in the People's Army as of August 1, 1949.

Stalin agrees with Mao on excluding the withdrawal of troops from the armistice negotiation agenda.

Stalin agrees with Mao's position in the 13 July telegram.

Stalin cables his chief political and military representatives in Pyongyang in response to messages relating the increasingly dire situation in Korea as North Korean forces were driven back across the 38th parallel. Stalin demands that they establish defenses along the 38th parallel to prevent further American advance and even go on the offensive by organizing “guerrilla warfare” in the south behind enemy lines.

Stalin agrees with Mao Zedong that North Korea is not yet ready to launch an assault, and reports that the Soviet Union has told North Korea to concentrate on developing liberated areas and guerrillas in South Korea.

Stalin agrees to send ammunitions to Mao in preparation for a US attack.

Mao informs Stalin that they published a list of conditions under which they would consider entering negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing.

Reply from Stalin to Shtykov's telegram of July 1, 1950. Requests additional information on KPA plans and reaction to American internvention. Informs of intent to meet requests by Kim Il Sung for additional war materiel.

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) describing the successes of KPA forces in the South. He also relays the concern of some of the DPRK cadre regarding American intervention.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.