The telegram relays a request from Mao, conveyed via Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, seeking Stalin’s “personal clarifications” of his stand on a potential North Korean action to reunify the country. Mao sought the information after hearing a report from Kim, who had arrived that day in the Chinese capital for a secret two-day visit and clearly claimed that he had received Stalin’s blessing.

After acknowledging Syngman Rhee's solitary role in blocking the passage of the armistice agreement, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung draft a response to General Clark.

The ambassador describes an August 25 meeting with GDR Ambassador Schneidewind.

In a discussion between Mao Zedong and Ri Ju-yeon, Mao expresses a positive attitude toward China-North Korea relations, though indicates he is unaware that Kim Il Sung was then in the Soviet Union.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.

The included telegram from Mao to Peng, Gao, and Kim gives Mao’s military instructions for the upcoming peace negotiations.

Stalin sends his advice on peace negotiations to Mao, as requested by Mao’s telegram of the same day.

Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

A forward to Stalin of a message sent earlier by Mao to Peng Dehuai. It outlines operational plans for the PLA and KPA in and around Seoul and talks about the need to gain an advantageous military position with negotiations in mind.

Telegram from Mao to Stalin relaying the assessment of Li Kenong of the state of the ongoing armistice talks. He states that the US is unwilling the accept the 38th parallel as the demaracation line and that given the state of North Korean forces, they should consider make concessions to American demands in this regard in the interests of ceasing hostilities.