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Documents

March 19, 1974

Record of conversation Between T.N. Kaul and Henry Kissinger, 'Indian Ocean'

They discuss creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean.

May 4, 1958

Note by Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt on Note from the United States

Dutt analyzes a note by the US government on Antarctica passed to India via the UK.

October 24, 1977

Telegram from K. V. Rajan, First Secretary (Pol), 'Agha Shahi’s meeting with [Cyrus] Vance'

Reported comments by Agha Shahi’s on relations with the United States, India, and nuclear weapons.

June 6, 1975

Political Report on the Month of May,1975, Meeting between US President Ford and New Zealand Prime Minister Rowling

The US and New Zealand will maintain amicable relations and cooperate for a Pacific nuclear-free zone

August 2, 1973

Rajya Sabha Report on Nuclear Conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan

Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha on the nuclear energy conference in the United States specifically research, educational reactors, technology, social impacts of nuclear power, and others.

June 5, 1951

Secret Letter from Roger Makins to Michael W. Perrin

Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office informs Michael Perrin, Deputy Controller for Atomic Energy, about negotiations between India and the United States and India and France for nuclear cooperation.

November 19, 1966

India Department of Atomic Energy, 'Cooperation with USA in the Development of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes'

Packet of material prepared by the Department of Atomic Energy regarding research cooperation with the United States. Includes a letter from Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a letter from Myron B. Kratzer, of the Division of International Affairs, and a draft of the research agreement.

August 12, 1996

US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

December 15, 1995

Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

December 15, 1995

Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

Pagination